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Abstract
This Comment argues that because NAFTA and the IEP do not safeguard environmental in-
terests adequately, additional measures need to be taken to preserve and prevent pollution of trans-
boundary water resources. Part I of this Comment discusses the present status of customary in-
ternational law, existing treaties, and national environmental laws that govern international water
pollution abatement and its judicial enforcement. This part specifically addresses liability un-
der the U.S. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, commonly known as the Clean Water Act (the
“CWA”).20 Part II discusses aspects of evolving international law, NAFTA, and the IEP with re-
spect to transboundary environmental resources. Part III demonstrates the deficiencies of existing
laws and treaties. This Comment concludes that although NAFTA and the IEP provide incentives
to protect transboundary waters through economic stability and shared scientific technology, only
specific implementation schemes and corresponding enforcement by an international agency and
the judicial system can guarantee adequate protection of transboundary water resources.
,THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT:
THE NEED TO PROTECT TRANSBOUNDARY
WATER RESOURCES
INTRODUCTION
Fear that the proposed North American Free Trade
Agreement ("NAFTA") 1 does not adequately address regional
environmental conditions at the U.S.-Mexican and U.S.-Cana-
dian borders currently impedes its passage. 2 Policy experts be-
lieve that free trade between countries of unequal economic
standing results in a compromise in environmental regula-
tion. 3 Consequently, trade negotiators must recognize the dif-
ferences between each country's environmental regulations as
they work to promote free trade.4 As a developing country,
Mexico suffers from an enormous foreign debt, the inability to
acquire additional loans, an escalating population, and a high
unemployment rate.5 Mexico maintains environmental stan-
dards that are among the worst in the world.6 In addition,
even where comprehensive environmental legislation exists,
Mexico chooses a policy of economic growth over the costly
enforcement of environmental legislation.' The potential con-
sequences of free trade to transboundary waters at the U.S.-
1. North American Free Trade Agreement (Tentative Draft Sept. 6, 1992) [here-
inafter NAFTA], available in WESTLAW, NAFTA Database.
2. Myron A. Brilliant, The Importance of the Environment in International Trade: Spot-
light on NAFTA, BARRISTER, Fall 1992, at 47. NAFTA is currently being considered
under the fast-track legislative procedures. To avoid excessive revision that could
delay trade negotiations between heads of state, fast-track procedures prohibit the
U.S. Congress from amending a proposal prior to its adoption. Id.; see 19 U.S.C.
§ 2191 (1988) (setting forth fast-track procedures for trade negotiations).
3. Michael S. Feeley & Elizabeth Knier, Environmental Considerations of the Emerging
United States-Mexico Free Trade Agreement, 2 DUKEJ. COMP. & INT'L L. 259, 261 (1992).
Much of the controversy arises due to the disparate environmental standards and
differing levels of environmental regulatory enforcement. Id.; see generally Develop-
ments in the Law-International Environmental Law, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1484 (1991)
[hereinafter Developments] (discussing failure of international law to address disparate
environmental standards and regulatory enforcement among countries).
4. Rebecca A. Sanford, Comment, The Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement: Its As-
pects, Highlights, and Probable Impact on Future Bilateral Trade and Trading Agreements, 7
DICK. J. INT'L L. 371, 390 (1989).
5. Feeley & Knier, supra note 3, at 262.
6. Id. at 285; DEPT. OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE, NORTH
AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: CANADIAN ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW 73 (Oct.
1992) [hereinafter CANADIAN REVIEW].
7. CANADIAN REVIEW, supra note 6, at 73; Feeley & Knier, supra note 3, at 285.
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Mexican border" raise special concerns because current trea-
ties and laws have left these surface and ground waters either
scant or polluted.9
Mexico, however, is in a unique position as a developing
country to improve its economic and environmental conditions
because it shares a border with the United States.' 0 In 1990,
U.S. exports to Mexico totaled US$112 billion, which repre-
sents twenty-eight percent of total U.S. exports, and U.S.-Mex-
ican trade totaled US$59 billion." By stabilizing its economy
through free trade under NAFTA, Mexico potentially could in-
crease its technical resources to protect the environment and
thus raise and enforce its environmental standards.' 2
Although NAFTA may improve economic conditions in
Mexico, it does not guarantee protection of transboundary
water resources at the U.S.-Mexican border.13 Current envi-
ronmental conditions of the Great Lakes region and lack of en-
vironmental provisions in the Canada-United States Free
Trade Agreement ("CFTA")14 demonstrate that existing
mechanisms are inadequate to maintain environmental stan-
8. Brilliant, supra note 2, at 47.
9. See Melissa Crane, Note, Diminishing Water Resources and International Law: U. S. -
Mexico, A Case Study, 24 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 299, 313-317 (1991) (discussing inadequa-
cies of current and developing theories of international law regarding transboundary
water resources). Ground water is distinguished from surface water as water that
flows underground and can enter surface water resources. Id. at 299 n. 1.
10. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE DISPATCH, NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE
AGREEMENT 110, 111 (Tentative Draft Feb. 17, 1992) [hereinafter DEPT. oF STATE
DISPATCH] (predicting benefits to Mexico from free trade with United States). The
United States accounts for more than two-thirds of total Mexican trade. Id. at 110.
In addition, in 1990, U.S. commerce with Canada and Mexico totaled US$234 billion,
or 26% of total U.S. trade. Id. NAFTA would create the largest single market in the
world. Id. at 112.
11. Id. at 110.
12. Feeley & Knier, supra note 3, at 285. NAFTA may stimulate economic and
technical growth and allow Mexico to improve its environmental conditions. Bril-
liant, supra note 2, at 49; see generally DEPT. OF STATE DISPATCH, supra note 10 (discuss-
ing potentials of NAFTA including job creation and increased trade and investment).
13. See, e.g., Reilly Says NAFTA Gives Precedence to Environment Treaties Allowing Sanc-
tions, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1447, 1448 (Aug. 19, 1992) [hereinafter NAFTA Sanc-
tions]. While NAFTA may provide trade sanctions for environmental enforcement,
environmentalists severely criticize NAFTA. Id. Roni Lieberman of the Sierra Club
stressed that NAFTA will prohibit the strengthening of environmental standards. Id.
Justin Ward of the National Resource Defense Council also commented that there is
still a need to scrutinize NAFTA and its possible impact on the environment. Id.
14. Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement, Jan. 2, 1988, 27 I.L.M. 281
(1988) [hereinafter CFTA].
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dards and to resolve international environmental disputes.' 5
In addition, international law provides no binding obligation
between neighboring nations with respect to transboundary
natural resources.' 6 NAFTA also fails to provide additional
safeguards for the protection of transboundary waters at the
U.S.-Canadian border.' 7 The proposed Integrated Environ-
mental Plan (the "IEP") currently represents the initiatives of
the United States and Mexico designed to protect the environ-
ment at the U.S.-Mexican border.' 8 The IEP, however, lacks
treaty status, adequate enforcement provisions, and sufficient
funding for environmental regulation.' 9
This Comment argues that because NAFTA and the IEP
do not safeguard environmental interests adequately, addi-
tional measures need to be taken to preserve and prevent pol-
lution of transboundary water resources. Part I of this Com-
ment discusses the present status of customary international
law, existing treaties, and national environmental laws that
govern international water pollution abatement and its judicial
enforcement. This part specifically addresses liability under
the U.S. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, commonly
known as the Clean Water Act (the "CWA").2 0  Part II dis-
cusses aspects of evolving international law, NAFTA, and the
15. Peter Gorrie, Great Lakes Clean-up at Critical Turning Point, CANADIAN GEO-
GRAPHIC, Dec. 1990/Jan. 1991, at 47-48; see Joel A. Gallob, Birth of the North American
Transboundary Environmental Plaintiff Transboundary Pollution and the 1979 Draft Treaty
for Equal Access and Remedy, 15 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 85, 116-19 (1991) (discussing
environmental treaties and laws specifically addressing water pollution of Great
Lakes region); see also Barbara K. Bucholtz, Coase and the Control of Transboundary Pollu-
tion: The Sale of Hydroelectricity Under the United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement of
1988, 18 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 279, 316-17 (1991) (discussing possibility of using
free trade agreement such as CFTA to encourage behavior that protects environ-
ment). Canada and the United States are the world's largest trading partners. Id. at
296-97 n.98. Over 25% of Canada's exports go to the United States. Id.
16. See Crane, supra note 9, at 315-17 (analyzing current and developing theo-
ries of international law regarding transboundary natural resources).
17. See CANADIAN REVIEW, supra note 6, at 16-22 (discussing environmental pro-
visions of NAFTA and advocating further negotiations and agreements before adop-
tion of NAFTA).
18. See U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY ET AL., INTEGRATED ENVIRON-
MENTAL PLAN FOR THE MEXICO-U.S. BORDER AREA (FIRST STAGE 1992-1994) (Work-
ing Draft Aug. 1, 1991) [hereinafter IEP] (setting forth U.S.-Mexican commitment to
address environmental issues at border area).
19. Feeley & Knier, supra note 3, at 267.
20. Federal Water Pollution Control Act §§ 310(a), 505(a), 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1320(a), 1365(a) (1988).
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IEP with respect to transboundary environmental resources.
Part III demonstrates the deficiencies of existing laws and trea-
ties. This Comment concludes that although NAFTA and the
IEP provide incentives to protect transboundary waters
through economic stability and shared scientific technology,
only specific implementation schemes and corresponding en-
forcement by an international agency and the judicial system
can guarantee adequate protection of transboundary water re-
sources.
I. CURRENT REGULATION OF TRANSBOUNDARY WATERS
OF THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO
Customary international law and several national laws and
treaties currently create binding obligations between the
United States, Mexico, and Canada with respect to trans-
boundary waters.21 The U.S.-Mexican transboundary waters
primarily encompass ground water and surface water including
the Colorado River, the Rio Grande, the Tijuana River, the Rio
Bravo, and the New River. 22  The U.S.-Canadian trans-
boundary waters primarily consist of the Great Lakes basin.23
Customary international law, treaties, and domestic laws con-
tribute to the regulation of pollution of water resources.24
A. Customary International Law
Under customary international law, a nation has an abso-
lute and exclusive right to use, and even exploit, its own natu-
ral resources without concern for the neighboring nation that
shares such natural resources. 5 The United Nations General
Assembly Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural
21. See generally Feeley & Knier, supra note 3 (discussing NAFTA and environ-
mental concerns with respect to Mexico); Robert E. Cattanach & Peter V. O'Conner,
Environmental Concerns Raised by the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement, 18 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 461 (1992) (discussing CFTA and environmental concerns with
respect to Canada); Crane, supra note 9 (discussing transboundary groundwater re-
sources and related international law and treaties with Mexico).
22. See IEP, supra note 18, at 111-16 to 111-25 (discussing major environmental
concerns regarding transboundary water resources at U.S.-Mexican border).
23. See Gallob, supra note 15, at 116-19 (discussing environmental treaties and
laws specifically addressing water pollution of Great Lakes region).
24. Developments, supra note 3, at 1489.
25. Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, G.A. Res. 3171, U.N.
GAOR, 28th Sess., Supp. No. 30, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973).
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Resources espouses this view of territorial sovereignty. 26 Ac-
cordingly, customary international law provides no specific
legal obligations with respect to irrigation and industrial uses
of waters.27
Despite this view of absolute territorial sovereignty, the
obligation to prevent transboundary pollution may fall upon a
nation.2 8  The international Arbitral Tribunal in Trail Smelter
(U.S. v. Can.)2 ' held that a nation is liable where the court finds
a substantial environmental harm by clear and convincing evi-
dence. o In Trail Smelter, the United States brought suit against
Canada for air pollution that damaged U.S. crops resulting
from a Canadian smelting operation in British Columbia."'
The Arbitral Tribunal's decision required Canada to compen-
sate for damage from the smelting operation, which may sug-
gest an acknowledgement of an obligation between nations to
protect transboundary resources.' 2 Trail Smelter echoes the
common law principle of sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas ("sic
utere"), meaning that activities within one nation should not
harm persons or property within another nation." Currently,
however, there is no binding assent to the international duty of
sic utere. 3'4 Therefore, customary international law provides lit-
26. Id.. But see United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 20, 1982,
art. 194(2), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/122, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261, 1308 [hereinafter
Law of the Sea Convention] (acknowledging duty limited by territorial sovereignty).
27. Crane, supra note 9, at 317 (highlighting reliance of nations on theory of
territorial sovereignty)
28. Developments, supra note 3, at 1492.
29. 3 R.I.A.A. 1906, 1938 (1949).
30. Id. at 1965.
31. Id.
32. See id.
33. See Chapman v. Barnett, 169 N.E.2d 212, 214 (Ind. Ct. App. 1960). The
court in Chapman sets forth the common law maxim of sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas
("sic utere"). Id.; see BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 1380 (6th ed. 1990) (defining sic utere).
Sic utere means that "one should use his own property in such a manner as not to
injure that of another." Id. The dicta of the Arbitral Tribunal in Trail Smelter pro-
vides
[u]nder the principles of international law ... no State has the right to use
or permit the use of its territory in such a manner as to cause injury ... in or
to the territory of another or the properties or persons therein, when the
case is of serious consequence and the injury is established by clear and
convincing evidence.
Trail Smelter, 3 R.I.A.A. at 1965.
34. See Developments, supra note 3, at 1501 (discussing lack of consensus necessary
to establish customary international law).
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tie basis for cooperation between the United States, Mexico,
and Canada in the cleanup of transboundary waters.
Concerning private parties, international legal analysts
have developed the notion of state responsibility where a state
is responsible for the acts of private citizens." Efforts to estab-
lish an effective international liability scheme for environmen-
tal pollution, however, have failed.36 Currently, there is no
codification of state responsibility for violations by private citi-
zens.3 7 Consequently, only vague customary duties exist, and
almost any activity can be construed as consistent with custom-
ary international law.3 8
B. Treaties Concerning U.S.-Mexican and U.S.-Canadian
Transboundary Waters
The United States and Mexico have negotiated a series of
treaties to address preservation and pollution abatement issues
involving transboundary water resources.3 9 The United States
and Canada similarly have signed treaties to address these
35. E.g., JAMES BARROS & DOUGLAS M. JOHNSTON, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF
POLLUTION 75 (1974). Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 22 (Judgment of
Apr. 9), can be construed as establishing state responsibility for transboundary pollu-
tion. See Developments, supra note 3, at 1497 n.31. When two British cruisers, while
passing through the Corfu Channel where right of innocent passage had been estab-
lished, were sunk by Albanian mines, the International Court ofJustice affirmed the
theory that a state has an "obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to be used
for acts contrary to the rights of other states." Corfu Channel, 1949 I.CJ. at 22. Corfu
Channel may, however, offer the international environmental polluter an escape from
liability by notifying another nation of its intent to pollute. See Christopher D. Stone,
86 AM. J. INT'L L. 445, 464 (1992) (discussing interpretation of Corfu Channel with
respect to liability for pollution of transboundary waters).
36. Developments, supra note 3, at 1506-08. Generally, the acts of police, legisla-
tures, and administrative officials are attributable to the nation. Id. at 1495. Private
parties, however, are more likely to be the source of transboundary pollution. Id. In
such a case, a nation must only exercise "due diligence" to prevent substantial trans-
boundary pollution. Id.
37. Id. International courts inadequately resolve international environmental
disputes. Id. at 1561. Customary international law is not well-defined. Id. at 1562.
Nor does the International Court ofJustice have the necessary scientific and technical
expertise to address environmental disputes. Id. Furthermore, only nations have
standing to sue in the International Court of Justice. Id. Private citizens are there-
fore unlikely to receive compensation for damage to persons or property resulting
from environmental harm. Id.; see Statute of the International Court of Justice, June
26, 1945, arts. 94-95, 59 Stat. 1031, 1051 (1945). "All Members of the United Na-
tions are ipsofacto parties to the Statute of the International Court of Justice." Id.
38. Developments, supra note 3, at 1493.
39. See Feeley & Knier, supra note 3, at 282-84 (discussing bilateral treaties ad-
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common interests in transboundary water resources. 40 These
treaties and customary international law attempt to resolve is-
sues concerning transboundary water resources.4 '
1. Treaties Concerning U.S.-Mexican Transboundary Waters
The U.S.-Mexican border has a long history of environ-
mental problems. 42  The border area consists of 1550 miles
from the Pacific Ocean to the Gulf of Mexico.43 Six states of
Mexico (Baja California, Sonora, Chihuahua, Coahuila, Nuevo
Leon, and Tamaulipas) and four states of the United States
(California, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas) adjoin the bor-
der.44 In 1990, the population of the major border cities was
approximately six million, having grown from over three mil-
lion in 1980. 45  The population at the border remains among
the poorest in the United States. 46 Although economic growth
has sometimes brought federal, state, and local investment in
the infrastructure, the border area of the United States and
Mexico, known as the colonias,4 7 continues to maintain substan-
dard housing, inadequate roads and drainage, and substan-
dressing water resources at the U.S.-Mexican boundary); Crane, supra note 9, at 313-
17 (same).
40. See Gallob, supra note 15, at 112-16 (discussing bilateral treaties concerning
water resources at the U.S.-Canadian border).
41. Developments, supra note 3, at 1489.
42. See IEP, supra note 18, § III (discussing environmental conditions at U.S.-
Mexican border).
43. Id. at 1-2.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 111-7.
46. Id. The disparity in wealth on the two sides of the U.S.-Mexican border is of
great significance. Id. For example, in 1984 the per capita income of San Diego, the
most affluent part of the border, was 6.5 times greater than that of the Mexican na-
tional average. Id. Along the border, U.S. per capita incomes remain at least twice
that of the Mexican average. Id. Overall, U.S. border counties rank among the
poorest in the United States. Id. More specifically, along the U.S. portion of the
border area, 25% of all families fall below the poverty line. Id. at III-I 1. Addition-
ally, 50% of the families at the border earn less than US$12,000. Id.
47. Id. at 111-37. Approximately 200,000 residents of Texas and New Mexico
reside in colonias. Id. These colonias are rural, unincorporated subdivisions along the
border. Id. Texas has 500 colonias accounting for a population of 140,000. Id.
While 76% of the Texas colonias have water supplies, less than one percent have sew-
age systems. Id. In New Mexico, 80% of the colonias have water and only seven per-
cent have sewer systems. Id. California also has approximately 10,000 residents in
colonias. Id. at 111-38. Where there is a lack of public sewer systems, private septic
systems often contaminate shallow wells of water supplies. Id. at 111-37. Unfortu-
nately, funding for public sewer systems has been unsuccessful. Id.
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dard or nonexistent water and sewage facilities.4"
The 1889 International Boundary Convention, an early in-
ternational agreement addressing environmental problems at
the U.S.-Mexican border, established the International Bound-
ary Commission to preserve and prevent future pollution of
the transboundary rivers.49 The Water Treaty of 1944 (the
"1944 Treaty") renamed this commission the International
Boundary and Water Commission (the "IBWC"). 5 ° Under the
1944 Treaty, the IBWC has limited jurisdiction over ground
and surface waters. 5' The 1944 Treaty also extended the au-
thority of the IBWC to undertake sanitation measures.52 The
IBWC currently has authority, subject to joint governmental
approval, to enter into agreements on planning, construction,
operation, and maintenance ofjoint projects concerning trans-
boundary rivers.53
The 1944 Treaty established the obligations of the United
States and Mexico concerning transboundary waters.54 Article
3 of the 1944 Treaty prioritizes intended uses of the water to
limit waste and to protect the more crucial needs of society. 55
Furthermore, Article 10 of the 1944 Treaty allocates a fixed
amount of water, 1,500,000 acre-feet, that the United States
48. Id. at III-11.
49. Convention Between the United States of America and the United States of
Mexico to Facilitate the Carrying Out of the Principles Contained in the Treaty of
Nov. 12, 1884, and to Avoid the Difficulties Occasioned by Reason of the Changes
Which Take Place in the Bed of the Rio Grande and That of the Colorado River, Mar.
1, 1889, U.S.-Mex., 26 Stat. 1512, 1513.
50. Treaty Between the United States of America and Mexico Respecting Utili-
zation of Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande, Nov. 14,
1944, U.S.-Mex., 59 Stat. 1219, 1220 [hereinafter 1944 Treaty]. The International
Boundary and Water Commission [hereinafter IBWC] consists of one engineer-com-
missioner from the United States and one engineer-commissioner from Mexico, and
each heads a national section composed of engineering and legal advisors. Id. art. 2,
59 Stat. at 1223; see generally Charles J. Myers & Richard L. Noble, The Colorado River:
The Treaty With Mexico, 19 STAN. L. REV. 367 (1967) (discussing environmental regula-
tion of Colorado River and related provisions of 1944 Treaty).
51. 1944 Treaty, supra note 50, art. 2, 59 Stat. at 1224.
52. Id. art. 3, 59 Stat. at 1225; see IEP, supra note 18, at 111-16 (noting that IBWC
has had lead role for undertaking water sanitation since 1944 Treaty was entered into
force).
53. See 1944 Treaty, supra note 50, art. 2, 59 Stat. at 1222-25 (discussing gen-
eral duties of IBWC).
54. See id. arts. 3, 10, 59 Stat. at 1225, 1237-38.
55. Id. art. 3, 59 Stat. at 1225. For example, domestic uses take priority over
recreational uses. Id.
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must supply to Mexico through the Colorado River, although
it may originate from any source. 56 The United States has
complied with its obligations under the 1944 Treaty and has
avoided liability to Mexico by so doing."'
The 1973 Agreement Confirming Minute 242 of the Inter-
national Boundary and Water Commission (the "1973 Agree-
ment") between the United States and Mexico specifically ad-
dresses the problems of high concentrations of salt in the Col-
orado River.58  The 1973 Agreement also regulates
groundwater and limits the pumping of water within five miles
of the Arizona-Sonora boundary.59 The 1973 Agreement re-
spects the obligations under the 1944 Treaty.60
Finally, the 1983 Border Environmental Agreement (the
"1983 Agreement") commits the United States and Mexico to
cooperate to solve environmental problems in a 100-kilome-
ter-wide area on each side of the border. 6' The goal of the
56. Id. art. 10, 59 Stat. at 1237-38. The United States used the 1944 Treaty to
bind together obligations with respect to the Rio Grande and the Colorado River to
compensate Mexico for the fact that the United States uses much more of the Rio
Grande waters than it contributes. See Myers & Noble, supra note 50, at 371 (discuss-
ing political background to 1944 Treaty). The United States must also provide an
additional 200,000 acre-feet in times of surplus. 1944 Treaty, supra note 50, art. 10,
59 Stat. at 1237-38. In addition, Article 15 of the 1944 Treaty limits U.S. obligations
to 375,000 acre-feet through all of the All American Canal. Id. art. 15, sched. II, 59
Stat. at 1245-49. The 1944 Treaty also addresses the Tijuana River. Id. art. 16, 59
Stat. at 1249-50; see Convention Providing for the Equitable Distribution of the Wa-
ters of the Rio Grande for Irrigation Purposes, May 21, 1906, U.S.-Mex., 34 Stat.
2953 (setting forth additional U.S.-Mexican treaty obligations); Convention for the
Rectification of the Rio Grande in the El Paso-Juarez Valley, Feb. 1, 1933, U.S.-Mex.,
48 Stat. 1621 (same).
57. See 1944 Treaty, supra note 50 (setting forth principal U.S.-Mexican obliga-
tions concerning transboundary waters); Anne M. Morgan, Note, Transboundary Liabil-
ity Goes With the Flow? Gasser v. United States: The Use and Misuse of a Treaty, 30 NAT.
RESOURCESJ. 955, 964-68 (1990) (arguing that United States can rely on Article 10 of
1944 Treaty, which limits U.S. obligations to fixed allotment of water to avoid liabil-
ity to Mexico from harm caused by dams in United States).
58. August 30, 1973, U.S.-Mex., 24 U.S.T. 1968 [hereinafter 1973 Agreement].
59. Id. § 5, 24 U.S.T. at 1975. The limit is 160,000 acre-feet per year. Id.
60. E.g. 1944 Treaty, supra note 50, art. 10, 59 Stat. 1237-38 (setting forth prin-
cipal U.S.-Mexican obligations with respect to Colorado River); 1973 Agreement,
supra note 58, § 2, 24 U.S.T. at 1974 (reinforcing obligations under 1944 Treaty).
61. Agreement Between the United States of America and the United Mexican
States on Cooperation for the Protection and Improvement of the Environment in
the Border Area, Aug. 14, 1983, U.S.-Mex., art. 4, 22 I.L.M. 1025, 1027 (1983) [here-
inafter 1983 Agreement]. Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution of 1917, however,
prohibits foreign involvement, ownership, and investment in the border area.
CONST. art. 27 (Mex.). Mexico historically has maintained a protectionist and isola-
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1983 Agreement is to improve environmental conditions to
"the fullest extent practicable. ' 62 Mexico has sought the coop-
eration of the United States to improve standards for water re-
sources through the 1983 Agreement, under which the United
States must provide Mexico with quality water.63
2. Treaties Concerning U.S.-Canadian
Transboundary Waters
Treaties between the United States and Canada, analo-
gous to the treaties between the United States and Mexico,
complement customary international law in defining the obli-
gations concerning preservation and pollution abatement is-
sues involving U.S.-Canadian transboundary water re-
sources.' The Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 established
the primary obligations between the United States and Can-
ada.65 This bilateral treaty created the six-member Interna-
tional Joint Committee (the "IJC"), consisting of three mem-
bers from each country. 66 The IJC plays a central role in man-
aging the transboundary waters, especially the Great Lakes
basin.67 Under Article VIII of the Boundary Waters Treaty of
1909, the IJC has primary authority to manage issues arising
under this treaty.68 While Article IV prohibits pollution of
transboundary waters, the IJC has no binding authority with
respect to pollution and can only make recommendations to
tionist position that may impede cooperation with respect to environmental regula-
tion at the border. Feeley & Knier, supra note 3, at 259-61.
62. 1983 Agreement, supra note 61, art. 2, 22 I.L.M. at 1026.
63. Id.; see Morgan, supra note 57, at 964-68 (analyzing failed attempt by Mexico
to seek remedy since 1983 Agreement due to 1944 Treaty).
64. E.g., Boundary Waters Treaty, Jan. 11, 1909, U.S.-U.K., 36 Stat. 2448 [here-
inafter Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909].
65. Id.; see Gallob, supra note 15, at 112-16 (discussing Boundary Waters Treaty
of 1909); Cattanach & O'Conner, supra note 21, at 470-71 (same).
66. Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909, supra note 64, art. VII, 36 Stat. at 2451.
67. Gallob, supra note 15, at 112-13. Article II of the Boundary Waters Treaty
of 1909 provides that
any interference with or diversion from their natural channel of such waters
on either side of the boundary, resulting in any injury on the other side of
the boundary, shall give rise to the same rights and entitle the injured par-
ties to the same legal remedies as if such injury took place in the country
where such diversion or interference occurs ....
Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909, supra note 64, art. II, 36 Stat. at 2449.
68. Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909, supra note 64, art. VIII, 36 Stat. at 2451-
1992-19931 857
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the governments. 69 Read expansively, however, Article IV may
provide a basis for IJC authority to regulate pollution of trans-
boundary water resources.7 °
The United States and Canada have also enacted the
Great Lakes Water Quality Agreements of 1972 and 1978. 7'
The primary purpose of the Great Lakes Water Quality Agree-
ment of 1972 is the control of the balance between animal and
plant life in the waters through the management of phos-
phorus levels.72 The primary purpose of the Great Lakes
Water Quality Agreement of 1978 is the regulation of the
Great Lakes region using broad policies analogous to those of
the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909. 71 In addition, the 1983
Agreement Amending the Agreement on Great Lakes Water
Quality enhanced the authority of the IJC to address phos-
phorus reduction in the Great Lakes, but failed to provide en-
forcement powers.74
C. National Environmental Legislation
National legislation plays an important role in preserving
transboundary water resources and preventing their pollu-
tion.75 Mexico, Canada, and the United States are federations,
and the federal governments primarily regulate transboundary
69. Id. art. IV, 36 Stat. at 2450; see Gregory Wetstone & Armin Rosencranz,
Transboundary Air Pollution: The Search for an International Response, 8 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REV. 89, 134 (1984) (discussing IJC authority); Gallob, supra note 15, at 112-19 (dis-
cussing successes and failures of IJC).
70. Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909, supra note 64, art. VI, 36 Stat. at 2450.
Article IV provides that "[it is further agreed that the waters herein defined as
boundary waters and waters flowing across the boundary shall not be polluted on
either side to the injury of health or property on the other." Id.
71. Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement, Apr. 15, 1972, U.S.-Can., T.I.A.S.
No. 7312; Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement, Nov. 22, 1978, U.S.-Can., T.I.A.S.
No. 9257.
72. Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement, Apr. 15, 1972, U.S.-Can., T.I.A.S.
No. 7312; see Gallob, supra note 15, at 116-19 (discussing recent environmental con-
ditions, including concentrations of phosphorus).
73. Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement, Nov. 22, 1978, U.S.-Can., T.I.A.S.
No. 9257; see PAUL R. MULDOON, CROSS-BORDER LITIGATION, ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS
IN THE GREAT LAKES ECOSYSTEM 116 (1986) (discussing impact of agreement).
74. Agreement Amending the Agreement on Great Lakes Water Quality, Oct.
16, 1983, U.S.-Can., T.I.A.S. No. 10798.
75. Developments, supra note 3, at 1489 (including national laws as relevant in
regulating environmental pollution on international level).
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water pollution.7 6 In the international arena, the provincial
laws of Canada play a greater role than state laws of Mexico
and the United States because Canada generally gives priority
to provincial rather than federal legislation.77
1. Mexican Laws
In addition to bilateral treaties, Mexico maintains federal
legislation to address environmental issues.78 As a result of in-
adequate governmental policies addressing environmental
problems, the Mexican government passed the General Law of
Ecological Equilibrium and Environmental Protection (the
"GLEEEP") in 1988.79 The GLEEEP provides for broad pro-
tection of water resources, including their preservation and
preventing pollution of water resources.8 The GLEEEP
places primary responsibility for applying environmental legis-
lation with the Secretary of the Ministry for Urban Develop-
ment and Ecology ("SEDUE").8' The GLEEEP, however, re-
lies on the coordinate responsibilities of other government
agencies for environmental protection.82 Consequently, these
conflicting jurisdictions and the lack of economic and technical
resources for implementation of legislation have impeded en-
vironmental protection. 83 Furthermore, Mexican law and pol-
icy has not addressed the issue of environmental problems af-
fecting regions of the United States.84
In addition to national legislation, the 1983 amendments
to the Mexican Constitution guarantee the right of every citi-
76. See Jeffrey Bates et al., Doing Business Under Canadian Environmental Law, 11
Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 1, 3-6 (1990) [hereinafter Bates] (discussing relationship be-
tween federal and local legislation of Canada).
77. See id. at 5.
78. See generally Charles T. DuMars & Salvador Beltran Del Rio M., A Survey of the
Air and Water Quality Laws of Mexico, 28 NAT. RESOURCES J. 787 (1988) [hereinafter
DuMars & Del Rio] (discussing Mexican environmental legislation and constitutional
provisions).
79. Ley General del Equilibrio Ecol6gico y la Protecci6n al Ambiente, Diario
Oficial de la Federaci6n,Jan. 28, 1988 [hereinafter GLEEEP], reprinted in 4 INTER-AM.
LEGAL MATERIALS 663 (1988); see DuMars & Del Rio, supra note 78, at 812-13 (dis-
cussing important provisions of GLEEEP that regulate environment).
80. GLEEEP, supra note 79, 4 INTER-AM. LEGAL MATERIALS at 663.
81. See Id. ch. 3, 4 INTER-AM. LEGAL MATERIALS at 667-70 (outlining duties of
SEDUE).
82. Id. ch. 2, 4 INTER-AM. LEGAL MATERIALS at 665-67.
83. DuMars & Del Rio, supra note 78, at 801-04.
84. Id.
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zen to the protection of health. 8 5 Furthermore, Article 73 of
the Mexican Constitution gives the federal government the
power to protect public health by protecting the environ-
ment. 6 These governmental initiatives set only broad policy
statements and do not provide practical implementation and
enforcement guidelines.8 7
2. Canadian Laws
Like Mexico, Canada maintains domestic legislation to
regulate preservation and pollution abatement issues concern-
ing transboundary water resources."8 Canada consists of ten
provinces and two territories.8 9 Unlike the United States and
Mexico, the ten provincial governments of Canada have
broader legislative power than the federal government, espe-
cially in environmental regulation. 90 The federal government
indirectly regulates the environment through its power to
oversee navigation, fisheries, management of federal lands,
and relations with other nations. 9' The federal government
also regulates transboundary environmental issues.92
The Department of the Environment is the lead federal
agency responsible for the implementation of environmental
legislation in Canada.9 3 Most federal legislation is policy-ori-
ented and articulates broad policy goals.94 The Fisheries Act
addresses issues concerning water resources.95 In 1986, Can-
ada repealed and reincorporated most of its past environmen-
tal legislation into the Canadian Environmental Protection Act
85. CONST. art. 4 (Mex.); see DuMars & Del Rio, supra note 78, at 793 (discussing
constitutional provision relating to environment).
86. CONST. art. 73, XXIX-G (Mex.).
87. See DuMars & Del Rio, supra note 78, at 810.
88. See Bates, supra note 76, at 3-6 (discussing relationship of federal and local
legislation of United States and Canada).
89. Id. at 3.
90. Id. at 4.
91. David Hunter, The Comparative Effects of Environmental Legislation in a North
American Free Trade Area, 12 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 271, 278 (1987).
92. Id.
93. Bates, supra note 76, at 6.
94. Id.
95. Fisheries Act, R.S.C., ch. F-14 (1970) (Can.). Section 33(2) of the Fisheries
Act prohibits pollution of waters with a "deleterious substance." Id. § 33(2).
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(the "CEPA"). 96 The CEPA, however, has had no impact on
the Fisheries Act, 9 7 which continues to regulate water pollu-
tion.98
Because the CEPA is not comprehensive, 99 provincial leg-
islation maintains concurrent jurisdiction to fill the void left by
the CEPA and the Fisheries Act.' 00 The most important pro-
vincial legislation is that of Ontario, the largest trading partner
of the United States.' 1 The Ministry of the Environment is
the lead Ontario agency.'0 2 It oversees the Ontario Environ-
mental Protection Act,' 03 which broadly regulates all environ-
mental resources, and the Ontario Water Resources Act, which
regulates all ground and surface water resources. 0 4 The On-
tario Water Resources Act prohibits the discharge of anything
that impairs the quality of ground or surface water re-
sources. 0 5 These provincial laws work concurrently with fed-
eral legislation to address environmental protection.10 6 Cana-
dian law and policy fail to address environmental conditions
affecting the United States adequately.'0 7
3. U.S. Laws
The United States also maintains strong domestic legisla-
tion to regulate the environment.'0 8 The Clean Water Act au-
96. R.S.C., ch. 22 (1988) (Can.); see Bates, supra note 76, at 6-10 (discussing
provisions and role of CEPA).
97. Fisheries Act, R.S.C., ch. F-14 (1970) (Can.).
98. Id.; see Hunter, supra note 91, at 279 (discussing impact of Fisheries Act on
environmental regulation).
99. Cattanach & O'Conner, supra note 21, at 466.
100. Fisheries Act, R.S.C., ch. F-14 (1970) (Can.); see Hunter, supra note 91, at
278 (discussing relationship between Canadian federal and local legislation).
101. Ontario Environmental Protection Act, R.S.O., ch. 140 (1980) (Can.); see
Bates, supra note 76, at 3 (discussing significance of legislation of Ontario).
102. Bates, supra note 76, at 12 n.48.
103. R.S.O., ch. 140 (1980) (Can.); Cattanach & O'Conner, supra note 21, at
467-68.
104. Ontario Water Resources Act, R.S.O., ch. 361 (1980) (Can.); Cattanach &
O'Conner, supra note 21, at 468.
105. Ontario Water Resources Act, R.S.O., ch. 361, § 16 (1980) (Can.); Cat-
tanach & O'Conner, supra note 21, at 468.
106. See Gallob, supra note 15, at 145-46 (discussing court procedure concern-
ing choice of law questions).
107. See id. at 126-33 (discussing inability of courts to resolve analogous legisla-
tion of Canada and United States concerning transboundary pollution).
108. See Developments, supra note 3, at 1610 (discussing strength of U.S. legisla-
tion and importance in international environmental regulation).
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thorizes the Environmental Protection Agency (the "EPA") to
promulgate specific guidelines for national water quality stan-
dards.' 09 With respect to international water pollution, section
310(a) of the CWA gives U.S. courts statutory authority
through the EPA to award damages to non-U.S. nations in-
jured due to pollution originating in the United States.' °
Nothing in this statute, however, in any way affects the provi-
sions of the 1944 Treaty between Mexico and the United
States."' The IBWC still resolves most issues under treaties
concerning transboundary waters of the United States and
Mexico. " 12
Although no claims have been brought under section
310(a) of the CWA, judicial application of the analogous stat-
ute for international air pollution, section 115 of the Clean Air
Act (the "CAA")," 3 demonstrates the current status of inter-
109. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1314 (1988).
110. Id. § 1320(a). Regarding international pollution abatement, the CWA pro-
vides that
[w]henever the Administrator, upon receipts of reports, surveys, or studies
from any duly constituted international agency, has reason to believe that
pollution is occurring which endangers the health or welfare of persons in a
foreign country, and the Secretary of State requests him to abate such pollu-
tion, he shall give formal notification thereof to the State water pollution
control agency of the State or States in which such discharge or discharges
originate and to the appropriate international agency, if any. He shall also
promptly call such a hearing ... if such foreign country has given the United
States essentially the same rights with respect to the prevention and control
of pollution occurring in that country as is given that country by this subsec-
tion.
Id.
111. Id.
112. See Developments, supra note 3, at 1559-60 (discussing important role of in-
ternational agencies).
113. Clean Air Act § 115, 42 U.S.C § 7415 (1988). The relevant part of the
statute provides
(a) Whenever the Administrator, upon receipt of reports, surveys or studies
from any duly constituted international agency has reason to believe that
any air pollutant or pollutants emitted in the United States cause or contrib-
ute to air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public
health or welfare in a foreign country ... the Administrator shall give formal
notification thereof to the Governor of the State in which such emissions
originate.
(b) The notice of the Administrator shall be deemed to be a finding under
section 7410(a)(2)(H)(ii) of this title which requires a plan revision ....
(c) This section shall apply only to a foreign country which the Administra-
tor determines has given the United States essentially the same rights with
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national pollution abatement."14 During negotiations of the
Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement," 5 the effect of
acid rain on the environment was a primary concern." 16 Acid
rain is suspected of contaminating water resources and endan-
gering marine and human life." 7  Concerning acid rain
originating in the United States, the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia in Her Majesty the Queen ex rel Ontario v.
United States Environmental Protection Agency held that, absent
clear congressional intent to the contrary, a U.S. court must
defer to EPA discretion unless there is a clear abuse of agency
discretion." 8 A finding that pollution is emitted from the
United States is an "endangerment finding" under section
115(a) of the CAA. 1 9 A finding that the non-U.S. country
respect to the prevention or control of air pollution occurring in that coun-
try as is given that country by this section.
Id.; see Oil Pollution Act, 33 U.S.C. § 2707 (1988) (setting forth analogous statute for
foreign claims resulting from oil pollution originating in United States).
114. See Her Majesty the Queen ex rel Ontario v. United States Environmental
Protection Agency, 912 F.2d 1525 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (holding that EPA delay in mak-
ing "endangerment finding" and "reciprocity finding" was reasonable).
115. CFTA, supra note 14.
116. Brilliant, supra note 2, at 47. Acid rain is believed to result from sulphur
and nitrogen oxide emissions that convert to acids, combine with water vapors, and
precipitate later. Queen v. EPA, 912 F.2d at 1528. The Economic Commission for
Europe Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution demonstrates the
importance of acid rain. Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution,
Nov. 13, 1979, T.I.A.S. No. 10541, 18 I.L.M. 1442. The Memorandum of Intent
Between the United States and Canada also concerns transboundary air pollution
and specifically addresses acid rain. Memorandum of Intent Between the United
States and Canada Concerning Transboundary Air Pollution, Aug. 5, 1980, 32 U.S.T.
2521.
117. Developments, supra note 3, at 1488; Queen v. EPA, 912 F.2d at 1528.
118. Queen v. EPA, 912 F.2d at 1528. In Queen v. EPA, EPA Administrator Doug-
las M. Costle sent two letters, one to U.S. Secretary of State Edmund Muskie and one
to U.S. Senator George Mitchell (D-Maine), expressly specifying an "endangerment
finding" and a "reciprocity finding." Id. at 1528-29. Subsequent to these letters,
Don R. Clay, acting Administrator for Air and Radiation, wrote a letter stating that
they did not have sufficient information to undertake the regulatory program re-
quired by section 115. Id. at 1530. The court allowed the EPA to rely on these
letters as final agency action. Id. at 1531. The court relied upon the reasoning from
the trial court that an "endangerment finding" and a "reciprocity finding" require a
case-by-case analysis. Id. The court also concluded that the EPA's interpretation of
the letters was permissible, there was no abuse of discretion, and a 10-year wait for
agency action was not an undue delay. Id. at 1535.
119. Id. at 1527. Furthermore, under section 115(b) of the CAA, the need for
revision of a State Implementation Plan ("SIP") is the SIP revision. Id. at 1528; see 33
U.S.C. § 1320(a) (1988) (setting forth similar requirement for "endangerment find-
ing" in CWA).
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grants the United States similar rights as set forth in this sec-
tion is a "reciprocity finding" under section 115(c) of the
CAA. t20 To this date, neither Canada or the United States has
made an "endangerment finding" or a "reciprocity finding."'
Queen v. EPA demonstrates that courts are reluctant to compel
an "endangerment finding" and a "reciprocity finding" by the
EPA, and that the EPA is extremely slow in making such deter-
minations on its own.' 22
Under section 310(a) of the CWA, non-U.S. nations in-
jured by pollution created in the United States can recover
damages in U.S. courts. 23 The CWA requires that the EPA
make an "endangerment finding" that pollution originating in
the United States caused damage to a non-U.S. nation. 24 It
also requires that the EPA make a "reciprocity finding" that
the non-U.S. nation grants the United States the same rights to
sue for damages caused by pollution originating in that non-
U.S. nation. 2 5
In addition, there are obstacles imposed on lawsuits
brought against non-U.S. nations in U.S. courts, primarily
under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (the "FSIA")
which grants immunity to non-U.S. nations. 2 6 For example,
the FSIA barred jurisdiction to recover damages from oil pol-
lution in Texas that resulted from a tortious act on Mexican
territory.127 In order to deny immunity to the non-U.S. nation,
120. Queen t; EPA, 912 F.2d at 1527; see 33 U.S.C. § 1320(a) (1988) (setting
forth similar requirement for "reciprocity finding" in CWA).
121. See Queen v. EPA, 912 F.2d at 1535 (representing current deference of
courts to EPA's decision not to make "endangerment finding" or "reciprocity find-
ing").
122. See id.
123. 33 U.S.C. § 1320(a) (1988).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Federal Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1988)
[hereinafter FSIA]. The United States is a strong advocate of territorial sovereignty.
See Crane, supra note 9, at 316 n.124 (discussing effect of FSIA). The FSIA specifies
narrow exceptions to the general rule that a non-U.S. nation cannot be tried in a U.S.
court. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1988). The non-U.S. nation may still avoid a U.S.
court because the act of state doctrine holds that the United States should not judge
the acts of another state's government under the constitution of that state. Id.; see
e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964) (establishing act of
state doctrine). But see Foreign Assistance Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2370 (1988) (establishing
limited court jurisdiction to review acts of another state's government).
127. In re Sedco, 543 F. Supp. 561 (S.D. Tex. 1982).
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it is necessary for both the tort and the injury to occur in the
United States. 28
Likewise, the Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia in Public Citizen v. Office of the United States Trade Representa-
tives' 2 9 held that environmentalists could not sue to require an
environmental impact statement on the effects of NAFTA since
it is not "final agency action."'3 0 The U.S National Environ-
mental Policy Act ("NEPA") requires an environmental impact
statement on any governmental project that significantly im-
pacts the environment.' In addition, an environmental im-
pact statement must be prepared for government projects that
significantly impact the environment outside the United
States.3 2 Legal precedent, however, gives private citizens and
environmental groups little recourse to contest direct or indi-
rect injuries or threats of injuries from changes resulting from
NAFTA on the basis of their environmental concerns.' 3 3
Accordingly, international water pollution abatement has
proved to be ineffective due to the obstacles of both proce-
dural and substantive law, which often provide immunity to a
non-U.S. nation.' 4 Again, the IBWC and the IJC retain the
most authority to resolve disputes between the United States,
128. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1988). Immunity is denied for non-commer-
cial torts "occurring in the United States and caused by the tortious act or omission."
Id. § 1605.
129. 970 F.2d 916 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
130. Id.
131. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1988) (requiring environmental assessment of
social, economic, and environmental concerns for federal actions significantly affect-
ing environment).
132. Exec. Order No. 12,114, 3 C.F.R. 356 (1979) (requiring environmental im-
pact statement for all "major Federal actions significantly affecting the environment"
outside territorial control of United States).
133. E.g., Public Citizen, 970 F.2d at 918. Plaintiffs have also experienced diffi-
culty in bringing non-U.S. defendants into U.S. courts and subsequently enforcing
judgments. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992) (holding that
the plaintiffs had no standing to sue under Endangered Species Act without showing
of injury). In addition, in the case of harm to shared resources, no individual nation
has standing to sue the nation where pollution originates. Developments, supra note 3,
at 1503; see South West Africa (Eth. v. S. Af.; Liber. v. S. Af.) (Second Phase), 1966
I.CJ. 4, 47 (Judgment of July 18) (holding that no nation had standing to place re-
sponsibility on South Africa for violations of its obligations as United Nations
Mandatory).
134. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1988) (setting forth provisions of FSIA);
Crane, supra note 9, at 315-16 (discussing inadequacies of international water pollu-
tion abatement in light of principle of territorial sovereignty).
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Mexico, and Canada concerning pollution and preservation of
transboundary water resources. 135 The EPA and U.S. citizens
have made few advances through U.S. courts in the protection
of transboundary pollution. 36
II. PROVISIONS AFFECTING THE ENVIRONMENT UNDER
EVOLVING INTERNATIONAL LA W, CFTA, NAFTA, AND
THE INTEGRATED ENVIRONMENTAL PLAN
Currently, legal ideas and proposals are developing that
may affect the cleanup and future preservation of trans-
boundary water resources. 37 The proposed IEP directly ad-
dresses environmental conditions at the U.S.-Mexican bor-
der.' 38 The proposed NAFTA and the CFTA indirectly ad-
dress transboundary pollution through agreements directly
regulating trade. ' 3 9
A. Evolving International Law
While developing principles of international law appear
more sensitive to the effects of diminishing quantities and
qualities of natural resources, existing international law fails to
provide effective substantive or procedural guidelines to regu-
late environmental issues.'4 In Helsinki in 1966, the Interna-
tional Law Association proposed the establishment of an obli-
gation among nations to guarantee a reasonable and equitable
share of transboundary natural resources to neighboring na-
tions.' 4 ' The International Law Commission of the United Na-
tions asked thirty-four experts to codify the doctrine of state
135. See Gallob, supra note 15, at 112-16 (commenting on authority of IJC and
U.S.-Canadian treaties); Feeley & Knier, supra note 3, at 282-84 (commenting on
IBWC authority and U.S.-Mexican treaties).
136. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1320(a), 1365(a) (1988) (setting forth international water
pollution abatement and private citizen suit statutes).
137. See Developments, supra note 3, at 1498-1511 (discussing evolving principles
of international law that have not been adopted by nations as customary international
law).
138. IEP, supra note 18.
139. See NAFTA, supra note 1, pmbl. (listing priorities of NAFTA); CFTA, supra
note 14, ch. 6, 27 I.L.M. at 315-16 (setting forth technical standards on goods that
only indirectly affect environment).
140. See Developments, supra note 3, at 1498-1511 (discussing evolving principles
of international law that have not been adopted by nations as customary international
law).
141. INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, HELSINKI RULES ON THE USES OF THE
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responsibility and international liability.' 42 The U.N. Water
Conference in 1977 at Mar Del Plata, Mexico recommended
cooperation between nations to protect and develop shared
water resources.' 43 In addition, Principle 21 of the Stockholm
Conference in 1972 emphasized the need for international ob-
ligations between nations to protect transboundary re-
sources. 14  Principle 22, however, required only that a nation
''co-operate" in developing an international liability scheme
WATERS OF INTERNATIONAL WATERS art. V (1966) [hereinafter HELSINKI RULES]. To
assess environmental damage, the Helsinki Rules provide:
(2) Relevant factors which are to be considered include, but are not limited
to:
(a) the geography of the basin, including in particular the extent of the
drainage area in the territory of each basin State;
(b) the hydrology of the basin, including in particular the contribution
of water by each basin State;
(c) the climate affecting the basin;
(d) the past utilization of the waters of the basin, including in particular
existing utilization;
(e) the economic and social needs of each basin State;
(f) the population dependent on the waters of the basin in each basin
State;
(g) the comparative costs of alternative means of satisfying the eco-
nomic and social needs of each basin State;
(h) the availability of other resources;
(i) the avoidance of unnecessary waste in the utilization of waters of the
basin;
(j) the practicability of compensation to one or more of the co-basin
States as a means of adjusting conflicts among uses; and
(k) the degree to which the needs of a basin State may be satisfied,
without causing substantial injury to a co-basin State;
(3) The weight to be given to each factor is to be determined by its impor-
tance in comparison with that of other relevant factors. In determining what
is a reasonable and equitable share, all relevant factors are to be considered
together and a conclusion reached on the basis of the whole.
Id.
142. Developments, supra note 3, at 1498. A codification of the theory of state
responsibility would require a strict governmental scrutiny of private economic activi-
ties and make economic development more expensive. Id. at 1507-08. Such a codifi-
cation also implies a homogeneity of capabilities among all nations. Id. The study by
the International Law Commission to codify the theory of state responsibility over-
looks the varied economic and technical resources of each country. Id.
143. The United Nations Water Conference, Report of the Conference, U.N. Doc. E/
CONF.70/29, U.N. Sales No. E.77I1A.12 (1977).
144. Report Of The United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm,
June 5-16, 1972, reprinted in 11 I.L.M. 1416, 1420, princ. 21 (1972) (acknowledging
duty of care to other states and state's territorial sovereignty).
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for transboundary water.1 45 Ten years later, the 1982 Law of
the Sea Convention reiterated this duty. 1 46 Finally, the Restate-
ment (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States re-
quires that a nation regulate its own conduct to protect re-
sources that are shared by other nations. 147
These developing theories, however, differ vastly from the
customary practice of territorial sovereignty.148 The only cases
on transboundary pollution decided by the International Court
ofJustice were the Nuclear Tests cases in which the International
Court of Justice issued only interim orders directing France to
refrain from nuclear testing that might harm Australia or New
Zealand.' 49 The International Court ofJustice later noted that
pledges from the French government to refrain from such nu-
clear testing rendered moot the claims of Australia and New
Zealand. 150
145. Id. princ. 22; see Development, supra note 3, at 1508 (discussing principle of
cooperation among nations with respect to transboundary pollution).
146. Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 26, art. 235, 21 I.L.M. at 1315.
147. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 601(1) (1987). Relevant sections provide that
(1) a state is obligated to take such measures as may be necessary, to the
extent practicable under the circumstances, to ensure that activities within
its jurisdiction or control
(a) conform to generally accepted international rules and standards for
the prevention, reduction, and control of injury to the environment of an-
other state or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction; and
(b) are conducted so as not to cause significant injury to the environ-
ment of another state or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.
(2) A state is responsible to all other states
(a) for any violation of its obligations under Subsection (1)(a), and
(b) for any significant injury, resulting from such violation, to the envi-
ronment of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.
(3) A state is responsible for any significant injury, resulting from a viola-
tion of its obligations under Subsection (1), to the environment of another
state or to its property, or to persons or property within that state's territory
or under its jurisdiction or control.
Id.
148. See Crane, supra note 9, at 305-08 (discussing competing ideologies and
resulting reliance on strict territorial sovereignty).
149. Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), 1973 I.CJ. 99, 106 (Interim Order of June
22); Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1973 I.CJ. 135, 142 (Interim Order of June 22); see
Developments, supra note 3, at 1499 (citing Nuclear Tests as only dispute heard by Inter-
national Court ofJustice on international liability for transboundary pollution).
150. Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), 1974 I.CJ. 253, 267-272 (Judgment of Dec.
20); (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1974 I.CJ. 457, 472-478 (Judgment of Dec. 20); see Developments,
supra note 3, at 1500 (noting significance of Nuclear Tests cases).
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Except for Trail Smelter, 15' there are few notable interna-
tional arbitration cases that address transboundary environ-
mental pollution.'5 2  The Arbitral Tribunal in Lac Lanoux15 3
held that the French diversion of water from a French lake that
affected Spanish use of water did not violate treaty obligations
between France and Spain.' 54 Also, the Arbitral Tribunal in
Gut Dam Claims 55 held that Canada was liable to the United
States for damage from a dam constructed under an interna-
tional agreement." 6 These cases, however, have little prece-
dential value because they were decided on narrow grounds.15
7
B. Provisions of CFTA and NAFTA That Affect the Environment
1. CFTA
International free trade agreements currently address the
environmental interests of the United States and Canada. 58
On January 2, 1988, Prime Minister Brian Mulroney of Canada
and President Ronald Reagan of the United States executed
the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement.' 59 It be-
came effective on January 1, 1989.160 Its primary goal is the
elimination of trade barriers in the form of tariffs and quo-
tas.' 6 ' The CFTA consists of eight sections divided into
twenty-one chapters. 62 No chapter, however, exclusively ad-
151. Trail Smelter (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1906, 1938 (1949).
152. Developments, supra note 3, at 1499 (discussing few arbitration cases relevant
to transboundary pollution).
153. Lac Lanoux (Spain v. Fr.), 12 R.I.A.A. 281 (1957); see Developments, supra
note 3, at 1500 (noting significance of Lac Lanoux case).
154. Lac Lanoux, 12 R.I.A.A. at 317.
155. Canada-United States Settlement of Gut Dam Claims (Can. v. U.S.), Sept.
27, 1968 [hereinafter Gut Dam Claims], reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 118 (1969); see Develop-
ments, supra note 3, at 1500 (discussing significance of Gut Dam Claims).
156. Gut Dam Claims, 8 I.L.M. at 121.
157. Developments, supra note 3, at 1500. Furthermore, while international law
traditionally espouses a liability scheme based on negligence, as suggested by Trail
Smelter and Lac Lanoux, commentators have recently advocated a strict liability
scheme, as echoed by Principle 21 of the Stockholm Conference, to avoid subjectiv-
ity. Id. at 1509-11. A strict liability scheme, however, also proves to be subjective
because it inhibits economic growth in developing nations. Id.
158. Brilliant, supra note 2, at 49.
159. Bucholtz, supra note 15, at 296-97.
160. Id. at 297.
161. Id. at 297-98.
162. CFTA, supra note 14.
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dresses environmental issues.163  Only Chapter Six of the
CFTA contains technical standards that affect the environ-
ment. 64 These standards, however, only apply if they serve a
legitimate domestic interest.' 65 The CFTA contains no other
references to environmental protection. 166
2. NAFTA
NAFTA is a proposed free trade agreement between the
United States, Mexico, and Canada. 6 7 The primary goal of
NAFTA is to promote economic growth through expanded
trade and investment by reducing barriers to the flow of goods
and investment among the three signatory countries. 68 If suc-
cessful, NAFTA will combine more than 360 million people
into the world's largest market with a total output of over
US$6 trillion.16 NAFTA also proposes to foster free trade in a
manner consistent with environmental protection and conser-
vation. 70 With respect to the environment, NAFTA promises
to bolster the Mexican economy and create more economic
and technical resources for Mexico to use in decreasing pollu-
tion levels.' 7' NAFTA, however, fails to directly address envi-
ronmental preservation or pollution abatement issues concern-
ing transboundary natural resources. 72
163. Id.
164. Id. ch. 6, 27 I.L.M. at 315-16 (setting forth technical standards for agricul-
tural and other goods).
165. Id.
166. Cattanach & O'Conner, supra note 21, at 463. The CFTA does contain
specific dispute resolution provision but excludes reference to environmental or
technical issues. Bucholtz, supra note 9, at 300.
167. NAFTA, supra note 1; see CANADIAN REVIEW, supra note 6 (discussing envi-
ronmental provisions of NAFTA and advocating further negotiations and agreements
before adoption of NAFTA).
168. NAFTA, supra note 1, pmbl.
169. DEPT. OF STATE DISPATCH, supra note 10, at 110.
170. NAFTA, supra note 1, pmbl.
171. Brilliant, supra note 2, at 49; Feeley & Knier, supra note 3, at 285.
172. DEPr. OF STATE DISPATCH, supra note 10, at 110. U.S. goals include
(1) elimination of tariff barriers either immediately or over a period of time;
(2) elimination of non-tariff barriers on goods and services, such as import
licenses and quotas;
(3) establishment of open investment practices; and
(4) adequate and effective protection and enforcement of intellectual prop-
erty rights.
Id. NAFTA addresses six major areas: market access, trade rules, services, invest-
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NAFTA sets forth four major provisions directly affecting
the environment. 73 First, the United States would maintain
existing health, safety, and environmental standards by contin-
uing to prohibit the entry of goods that do not conform to en-
vironmental standards.174 Second, NAFTA would allow the
parties, including states and cities, to enact even tougher stan-
dards than currently exist.1 75 Third, NAFTA would encourage
the parties to make their standards compatible in order to
strengthen environmental and health protection, but not to
lower their standards. 76 Finally, NAFTA would preserve the
right to enforce obligations under other international treaties,
including limits on trade in products that threaten endangered
species or the ozone layer.' 77
ment, intellectual property rights, and dispute settlement. Id.; see Feeley & Knier,
supra 3, at 267 (noting NAFTA's omission of environmental provisions).
173. See NAFTA, supra note 1, Free Trade Negotiations with Mexico-Environ-
mental Matters (discussing major provisions of NAFTA that affect environment).
174. Id. art. 904(1). Each nation maintains the right to "adopt, maintain, and
apply standards-related measures" with respect to the environment. Id. In addition,
each nation has the right to "prohibit the importation of a good, if it fails to comply
with applicable measures or complete its approval procedures. Id.
175. Id. art. 904(2). A nation can "in pursuing its legitimate objectives of safety
or the protection of human, animal or plant life or health, the environment or con-
sumers, establish the level of protection it considers appropriate." Id. Furthermore,
Article 905 requires that a party use international standards as the "basis" for setting
its own standards and that a party's standards complies with international law. Id.
art. 905. Finally, Article 906(1) would require that the parties "work jointly to en-
hance the level of safety and of protection of human, animal and plant life and health,
the environment and consumers." Id. art. 906(i).
176. Id. art. 906. Many express a fear that harmonization, or maintaining
equivalent standards among the three nations, would lead to the adoption of the
lowest common denominator or the average level of protection. CANADIAN REVIEW,
supra note 6, at 18-19. This is called "downward harmonization." Id. at 18. To pro-
tect against "downward harmonization," NAFTA requires Mexico, Canada, and the
United States to work jointly and provide technical assistance to enhance standards-
related measures. See NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 913 (providing for technical assist-
ance).
177. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 104. In the event of inconsistencies between
NAFTA and other agreements listed in Article 104 and Annex 104.1, prior agree-
ments "shall prevail to the extent of the inconsistency." Id. These agreements in-
clude (1) Basel Convention on the Control and Transboundary Movements of Haz-
ardous Wastes and Their Disposal, Mar. 22, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 649 (1989); (2) Montreal
Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, 26 I.L.M.
1541 (1989); and (3) Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of
Wild Flora and Fauna, March 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243. Id. Article
104 does not contain a similar guarantee for the 1983 Agreement or the 1944 Treaty
to prevail over NAFTA in the case of inconsistencies. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 104.
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Other provisions of NAFTA indirectly address environ-
mental concerns. 78 In response to concerns that new invest-
ments in Mexico may exacerbate industrial pollution condi-
tions, the proposed agreement promises that environmental
protection will be further enhanced by its investment guide-
lines.' 79 Industries in Mexico that significantly pollute the en-
vironment under the auspices of U.S. governmental control
are referred to as the maquiladoras.180 NAFTA would allow the
parties to require environmental impact statements on any new
investments, such as the maquiladoras.'8 l Accordingly, the par-
ties would be able to impose stringent standards on new in-
vestments, as long as the standards apply equally to domestic
and foreign investors. 82
Also relevant to the issue of environmental standards at
the border is the method of dispute resolution, its efficiency,
and its effectiveness. 183 NAFTA would provide a special dis-
pute settlement procedure for trade issues arising under the
agreement and causing environmental problems. 84 Special
panels would be able to employ scientific experts to help re-
178. See NAFTA, supra note 1, Free Trade Negotiations with Mexico-Environ-
mental Matters (discussing provisions of NAFTA that affect environment).
179. Id.
180. See IEP, supra note 18, at III-1 1. Maquiladoras refers to processing and as-
sembly plants at the border area. Id. These industries are based outside of Mexico
and bring capital equipment, components, and raw materials into Mexico without
paying import duties. Id. Hazardous waste generated by these industries is either
treated locally under Mexican law or returned to the country of origin. Id. Finished
products from the maquiladoras are then exported to other countries subject only to a
duty on the value added in Mexico. Id. Although hazardous wastes should be treated
in such a manner, statistics demonstrate Mexico's low compliance with these rules.
Victor M. Castillo & Diane Perry, Environmental Implications of the Free Trade Agreement in
the Maquiladora Industry, TRANSBOUNDARY RESOURCEs REP., Summer 1992, at 3.
181. See NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 904.
182. Id. art. 904(3); see IEP, supra note 18, at 111-11. Since 1985, Mexican indus-
trialization policies have encouraged foreign subsidiaries to relocate on the Mexican
side of the border to promote manufactured exports. Id. Primarily U.S. firms took
advantage of Mexican industrialization policies. Id. Mexican exports rose from virtu-
ally nothing in the mid-1960s to US$800 million in 1980. Id. Article 904(4) requires
that any measure serve a "legitimate objective" to avoid unfair practices. NAFTA,
supra note 1, art. 904(4). Article 915(1) includes "protection of human, animal or
plant life" and "sustainable development" as legitimate objectives. Id. art. 915(1).
Article 907 would then allow a party to conduct a risk assessment of the legitimate
objective. Id. art. 907.
183. CANADIAN REVIEW, supra note 6, at 22 (discussing relevance of methods of
dispute settlement).
184. NAFTA, supra note 1, arts. 2005, 2007.
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solve disputes. 185 Under the proposed NAFTA, the burden of
proving that an environmental standard is consistent with the
agreement would be placed on the complaining party." 6
Finally, NAFTA should result in more efficient land trans-
port at the borders. 1 7 With less bureaucratic red tape, there
should be less time for vehicles to sit idle at the border. This
would clear congestion and pollution levels and will reduce air
pollution directly.' 88
C. The Integrated Environmental Plan
Because NAFTA does not directly address environmental
issues, environmentalists have advocated further negotiations
for agreements to protect the environment.' 89 Consequently,
on November 27, 1990, President Carlos Salinas de Gortari of
Mexico and President George Bush of the United States met in
Monterrey, Mexico to discuss issues of importance to both
countries. 90 Their meeting resulted in a joint communique
that includes commitments and directives concerning the envi-
ronment at the border extending from 1992 through 1994.'
The EPA of the United States and SEDUE of Mexico will work
together to develop an environmental plan to address issues
pertaining to the border area. 192 Subsequently, Presidents
Bush and Salinas released this comprehensive, multi-year Inte-
grated Environmental Plan specifically to protect the interests
of the border area in February 1992.'
Congress, however, is not considering the IEP along with
NAFTA for ratification.' Nor does the IEP reconcile the
1944 Treaty, which establishes fixed obligations between the
United States and Mexico, with the 1983 Agreement, which re-
185. Id. art. 2015.
186. Id. art. 914(4).
187. Id. annex 913-A.
188. Id. annex 913-A.
189. NAFTA Sanctions, supra note 13, at 1448 (expressing concerns of environ-
mentalists over NAFTA); see supra notes 173-88 and accompanying text (discussing
provisions of NAFTA that affect environment).
190. IEP, supra note 18, at II-1.
191. See id. (discussing joint communique).
192. See Id. (discussing role of EPA and SEDUE).
193. Brilliant, supra note 2, at 48. Consistent with the 1983 Agreement, the IEP
addresses issues of the border area defined as "an area 100 km on each side of the
international boundary" of the United States and Mexico. IEP, supra note 18, at I-1.
194. Brilliant, supra note 2, at 47.
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quires a commitment to improve environmental conditions at
the border. 95 The IEP includes goals with respect to major
transboundary waters but contains no binding implementation
schemes for either Mexico or the United States. 96 The IEP is
a statement of common environmental concerns of the United
States and Mexico. 97 Efforts are underway to improve air
quality, management and disposal of hazardous waste, and co-
operation in enforcing environmental regulations, particularly
at the border. l'9 As a separate document from NAFTA, how-
ever, the IEP will impose no new obligations even if the United
States and Mexico ratify NAFTA.' 99
III. DEFICIENCIES IN CURRENT PRACTICES AND THE
NEED FOR EFFECTIVE ENFORCEMENT OF
IMPLEMENTATION SCHEMES
Currently, customary international law, international trea-
ties, and national laws do not effectively address the need to
cleanup and protect transboundary waters. 20 0 Although evolv-
195. IEP, supra note 18, at 1-9. The 1983 Agreement "will be updated at a fu-
ture time as appropriate to take account of new information that results from imple-
mentation of this [p]lan." Id.; see 1983 Agreement, supra note 61, art. 3, 22 I.L.M. at
1026; see also Morgan supra note 57, at 964-68 (analyzing fixed obligations under
1944 Treaty).
196. IEP, supra note 18, at VI-3 to VI-10. The IEP only designates areas of con-
cern and an intent to cooperate in order to improve environmental conditions in
these areas. Id. The four goals with respect to the border area are to
(1) continue media-specific and multimedia monitoring and pollution con-
trol activities,
(2) strengthen present environmental regulatory activities and to supple-
ment the 1983 Border Environmental Agreement with new cooperative pro-
grams,
(3) mobilize additional resources for pollution control, and
(4) supplement present pollution control programs through pollution pre-
vention and voluntary action programs.
Id. at VI-I to VI-2.
197. See DEPT. OF STATE DISPATCH, supra note 10, at 114 (discussing some envi-
ronmental issues presented by IEP).
198. Id.
199. Brilliant, supra note 2, at 47-49; see Feeley & Knier, supra note 3, at 267
(commenting on lack of treaty status of IEP).
200. See generally Feeley & Knier, supra note 3 (discussing inadequacy of NAFTA,
IEP, treaties, and national laws in resolving environmental problems at U.S.-Mexican
border); Gallob, supra note 15 (discussing inadequacy of treaties and national laws in
resolving environmental problems at U.S.-Canadian border); Crane, supra note 9, at
313-17 (discussing inadequacies of international law concerning transboundary pol-
lution).
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ing international law, the CFTA, and the proposals of NAFTA
and the IEP provide incentives to improve environmental con-
ditions, they do not include guarantees of protection of trans-
boundary water resources. 2° 1 Therefore, the current system
requires specific standards and implementation schemes for
enforcement through international agencies and U.S. courts.
A. Deficiencies in Existing Customs, Laws and Treaties
Customary international law has failed to preserve and to
prevent pollution of transboundary natural resources in an ad-
equate fashion.2 °2 Furthermore, although international trea-
ties address environmental interests at the U.S.-Mexican and
U.S.-Canadian borders, they do not protect natural resources
adequately. 20 3 Finally, national laws ineffectively address pol-
lution of transboundary waters.20 4 The inadequacy of these
laws necessitates further implementation schemes and enforce-
ment of environmental standards.
1. Deficiencies in International Legal Theories
International law has failed to protect transboundary
water resources.20 5 International custom only becomes inter-
national law when it satisfies the requirement of opinio juris,
which occurs when all nations agree to be bound legally to that
custom. 20 6 Customary international law develops only when
nations follow a constant practice under the assumption that
international law requires such conduct.20 7 Given the great di-
201. Feeley & Knier, supra note 3, at 267; see Gallob, supra note 15, at 112-19
(discussing inadequacy of treaties and national laws in resolving water pollution
problems at U.S.-Canadian border); Crane, supra note 9, at 315-17 (discussing inade-
quacies of international law concerning transboundary pollution).
202. See Developments, supra note 3, at 1498-1511 (discussing generally ineffec-
tiveness of customary international law to address issue of transboundary pollution).
203. See generally Feeley & Knier, supra note 3 (discussing inadequacy of treaties
and national laws in resolving environmental problems at U.S.-Mexican border); Gal-
lob, supra note 15 (discussing inadequacy of treaties and national laws in resolving
environmental problems at U.S.-Canadian border).
204. See generally DuMars & Del Rio, supra note 78 (discussing relevant U.S.-
Mexican laws); Gallob, supra note 15 (discussing relevant U.S.-Canadian laws).
205. See Developments, supra note 3, at 1504 (concluding that effective interna-
tional law requires nations to surrender some sovereignty).
206. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES §" 102(2) (1987).
207. Developments, supra note 3, at 1504.
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versity of views, no binding obligation between nations to pre-
serve or to prevent pollution of transboundary natural re-
sources exists.2 °8 Currently, no operational system to establish
international liability has emerged.2 0 9 The principle of sic utere
remains a vague concept without realistic application.21 0
With respect to transboundary natural resources, there
are two competing views that define the relationship between
neighboring nations. The traditional view advocates a rule of
territorial sovereignty where a nation has the absolute and ex-
clusive right to explore and exploit its resources in any man-
ner. In opposition, there is a developing concept that a na-
tion may not substantially injure a neighboring nation through
pollution of transboundary resources.21 2 In addition, develop-
ing theories in international law provide that neighboring na-
tions have a right to a "reasonable and equitable share" of
transboundary resources.2 3 Nations, however, have not
agreed to be bound legally to these latter views that create a
duty from one nation to another to both prevent pollution and
preserve natural resources.2 4 Irrigation and industrial pollu-
tion have destroyed waters that cross the U.S. borders. t5
Each country, however, still has the right to the absolute and
208. Id. at 1506. The diversity of interests among nations results in only vague
obligations. Id.
209. Id. at 1499.
210. Id. at 1501; see supra note 33 and accompanying text (discussing concept of
sic utere).
211. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text (discussing theory of territo-
rial sovereignty).
212. See Trail Smelter, 3 R.I.A.A. at 1965.
213. HELSINKI RULES, supra note 141, art. V; see supra notes 140-57 and accom-
panying text (discussing non-binding international legal theories creating duties
among nations to protect transboundary waters).
214. Developments, supra note 3, at 1506.
215. E.g., 1973 Agreement, supra note 58, § 6, 24 U.S.T. at 1975-76 (represent-
ing an attempt by the United States and Mexico to address environmental problems
of transboundary waters); Gorrie, supra note 15, at 51-53. The 1973 Agreement ad-
dresses the salinity problem of the Colorado River resulting from U.S. irrigation and
drainage practices. 1973 Agreement, supra note 58, § 6, 24 U.S.T. at 1975-76. This
agreement limits developments in the border area that might adversely affect either
country. Id. The United States and Mexico also must consult each other on new
projects that might adversely affect each other. Id. The Great Lakes similarly have a
long history of pollution from agricultural and other "non-point" sources. Gorrie,
supra note 15, at 51-53.
TRANSBOUNDARY WATER AND NAFTA
exclusive use of the waters under its jurisdiction.216 Therefore,
under international law there is no operational rule to preserve
natural resources and to reduce pollution for the benefit of a
neighboring nation.21 7
Furthermore, ineffective procedural rules developed by
legal analysts hamper elimination of transboundary pollution
because they fail to prevent confrontations among nations
before they arise.21 8 For example, a duty to inform another
nation of an existing danger provides no concrete guidance for
a nation to determine whether certain conduct comports with
customary international law. 21 9 A duty to assess environmen-
tal dangers to transboundary resources, as enunciated in Lac
Lanoux, also fails to establish specific criteria to guide coun-
tries.220 Such procedural duties, similar to those in the United
States under NEPA,22' also fail to provide for adequate judicial
review. 22 These duties have also failed to gain consensus in
the international community. 223 Finally, procedural rules fail
by allowing countries to escape liability by merely informing a
neighboring nation of an existing environmental danger.224
2. Deficiencies in Existing U.S.-Mexican Treaties
Tensions exist between the United States and Mexico due
to their reliance on competing treaties, the 1944 Treaty225 and
216. See Developments, supra note 3, at 1498-1506 (discussing acceptance of terri-
torial sovereignty).
217. Id. at 1499.
218. See id. at 1512-20 (discussing procedural duties to protect environment
outside nation's jurisdiction); supra notes 126-33 and accompanying text (discussing
relevant procedures).
219. Developments, supra note 3, at 1513.
220. Lac Lanoux (Spain v. Fr.), 12 R.I.A.A. 281 (1956); see Developments, supra
note 3, at 1500 (discussing Lac Lanoux case); supra notes 153-54 and accompanying
text (discussing significance of case). The Law of the Sea Convention also provides a
similar duty to assess environmental dangers. Law of the Sea Convention, supra note
26, arts. 204-206, 21 I.L.M. at 1309.
221. See supra note 131 and accompanying text (discussing procedures related to
NEPA).
222. See Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 226
(1980) (establishing "arbitrary and capricious" standard ofjudicial review); Develop-
ments, supra note 3, at 1515.
223. Developments, supra note 3, at 1515.
224. Id. at 1520.
225. 1944 Treaty, supra note 50, 59 Stat. at 1219.
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the 1983 Treaty.226 The United States currently relies on the
1944 Treaty, which limits its obligations to provide Mexico a
fixed allocation of water from U.S. rivers.227 The 1944 Treaty
does not guarantee Mexico any quality of water through these
allocations.228 For example, even the brine from a desalination
plant is counted as part of the water delivery commitment.2 29
Consequently, under the 1944 Treaty, Mexico may not obtain
adequate water resources from the United States.230
In contrast, Mexico interprets the 1983 Agreement as a
commitment that the United States has a duty to preserve and
prevent pollution of these same transboundary waters. 23' The
1983 Agreement, upon which Mexico currently relies, sets
forth the commitment between the United States and Mexico
to improve environmental conditions at the border area. 32
This agreement by its terms obligates improvement of envi-
ronmental conditions only to "the fullest extent practica-
ble. ' 233 In addition, given the weak economy of Mexico, the
standard of "the fullest extent practicable" imposes only a
minimal obligation on Mexico to preserve transboundary
water resources or to prevent their pollution.234 Therefore,
the 1983 Agreement is currently ineffective and needs to be
strengthened. 3 5
Conflicting U.S. and Mexican interests in water quantity
and quality has resulted in diminished cooperation and lack of
incentives for either nation to regulate its agricultural and in-
226. 1983 Agreement, supra note 61, 22 I.L.M. at 1025.
227. 1944 Treaty, supra note 50, arts. 10, 15, 59 Stat. at 1237-38, 1243-1249; see
supra notes 50-57 and accompanying text (discussing major provisions of 1944
Treaty).
228. 1944 Treaty, supra note 50, arts. 10, 15, 59 Stat. at 1237-38, 1243-1249; see
supra notes 50-57 and accompanying text (discussing major provisions of 1944
Treaty).
229. Allen V. Kneese, Environmental Stress and Political Conflicts: Salinity in the Colo-
rado River, TRANSBOUNDARY RESOURCES REP., Summer 1990, at 3.
230. See id. (presenting facts suggesting inadequacy of treaties in solving envi-
ronmental problems)
231. 1983 Agreement, supra note 61, art. 1, 22 I.L.M. at 1026; see supra notes 61-
63 (discussing major provisions of 1983 Agreement).
232. 1983 Agreement, supra note 61, art. 1, 22 I.L.M. at 1026.
233. Id. art. 2, 22 I.L.M. at 1026.
234. Castillo & Perry, supra note 180, at 3; see 1983 Agreement, supra note 61,
art. 3, I.L.M. at 1026 (setting forth U.S.-Mexican commitment to improve environ-
mental conditions at border).
235. Castillo & Perry, supra note 180, at 3.
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dustrial uses of its waters to protect the waters that reach the
other country.23 6 Without cooperation, the United States has
been forced to implement plans that are not cost-effective.23 7
For example, as a result of negotiations and the treaties, a
desalination plant in Yuma Valley, Arizona was constructed
over a period of fourteen years at the cost of US$258 million to
U.S. taxpayers. 23 8  More economical solutions may have in-
cluded reduction of irrigated acreage or the purchase of water
rights.2 3 9 The desalination plant is expected to cost US$584
per acre-foot of water, whereas the purchase of water rights
would cost only forty U.S. dollars per acre-foot. 240 Although
the purchase of water rights may have been a better choice,
U.S. politics defeated these options.24  The problem arises
from the 1944 Treaty because it gives priority to the goal of
maintaining a fixed allocation of water to Mexico regardless of
quality.242
The conflicting attitudes of the United States and Mexico
have hindered environmental preservation and pollution
abatement attempts to protect transboundary water re-
sources. 243 The 1983 Agreement fails to specifically set techni-
cal standards as goals for the two nations.24 4 The 1944 Treaty
completely excludes any obligation to supply quality water to
Mexico. 24 ' A significant problem arises because much of the
destruction of water resources at the U.S.-Mexican border re-
236. See, e.g., Morgan, supra note 57, at 964-68 (analyzing inadequacy of 1944
Treaty in addressing pollution of U.S.-Mexican transboundary waters).
237. Kneese, supra note 229, at 2-3.
238. See Jenifer Warren, Yuma Desalination Plant Comes of Age-Too Late, L.A.
TIMES, March 8, 1992 (discussing salinity problems of Colorado River and costly
measures to remedy its destruction).
239. Kneese, supra note 229, at 2.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. See Morgan, supra note 57, at 964-68 (discussing inadequate regulation of
environment at border since 1944 Treaty); 1944 Treaty, supra note 50, arts. 10, 15,
sched. II, 59 Stat. at 1237-38, 1245-49 (setting forth very specific obligations under
1944 Treaty).
243. See Feeley & Knier, supra note 3, at 284 (commenting on lower standards
and enforcement of Mexico as compared to United States).
244. See 1983 Agreement, supra note 61, art. 2, 22 I.L.M. at 1026 (setting forth
obligations under 1983 Treaty); Castillo & Perry, supra note 180, at 3 (discussing
ineffectiveness of 1983 Agreement).
245. 1944 Treaty, supra note 50, 26 Stat. at 1219; see supra notes 50-57 and ac-
companying text (setting forth major provisions of 1944 Treaty).
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sults from "non-point" sources, sources that are difficult to
regulate because their origins are untraceable. 46 Conse-
quently, the IBWC, the international commission with author-
ity to regulate transboundary waters, requires greater enforce-
ment powers to preserve and to prevent pollution of trans-
boundary water resources. 47
3. Deficiencies in U.S.-Canadian Treaties
Treaties between the United States and Canada have
proven to be equally limited in preserving and preventing pol-
lution of transboundary water resources.248 The Boundary
Waters Treaty of 1909 limits the authority of the IJC to regu-
late diversion of water channels. 49 It does not extend IJC au-
thority to regulate the introduction of pollutants into water re-
sources. 2 0 Expansion of IJC authority is necessary to resolve
short-range pollution of natural resources.2 51 Additional safe-
guards are necessary to resolve long-range pollution since site-
specific regulation is impossible.2 52 Water pollution resulting
from "non-point" sources, such as agricultural pollutants and
rain run-off, also pose serious challenges since site-specific
regulation is impossible.253 Accordingly, IJC authority needs
to be expanded to regulate long-range pollution and "non-
point" source destruction of transboundary water resources.
246. See Myers & Noble, supra note 50, at 406-11 (discussing water quality
problems resulting from irrigation and agricultural uses of water in United States).
247. See Feeley & Knier, supra note 3, at 288 (advocating comprehensive pro-
gram, greater enforcement, and increased funding). Similarly, the IJC has failed to
adequately protect the environment. See Gallob, supra note 15, at 113-19 (discussing
IJC's inability to make binding decisions regarding pollution of shared resources and
IJC's inability to resolve disputes due to lack of reciprocal rights and remedies in
courts).
248. See Gorrie, supra note 15, at 47 (discussing current environmental condi-
tions of Great Lakes region); Gallob, supra note 15, at 116-19 (discussing efficacy of
cleanup of Great Lakes).
249. Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909, supra note 64, art. II, 36 Stat. at 2449; see
supra notes 64-70 and accompanying text (discussing major provisions of treaty).
250. Boundary Waters treaty of 1909, supra note 64, arts. IV, VI, 36 Stat. at
2450, 2451.
251. See Gallob, supra note 15, at 143 (discussing possibility to expand IJC au-
thority with respect to short-range pollution).
252. Id.
253. Id. at 117; see Gorrie supra note 15, at 51 (discussing various "non-point"
sources).
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4. Deficiencies of Existing Domestic Mexican, Canadian, and
U.S. Legislation
International environmental regulation includes adequate
domestic laws to prevent pollution and preserve natural re-
sources on a national level. 54 Mexico has less stringent envi-
ronmental standards and enforcement of domestic legislation
than the United States and Canada.255 In addition, although
provinces in Canada and the United States have similar envi-
ronmental standards and enforcement measures, both nations
have not adequately resolved the problem of pollution of
transboundary water resources.256
a. Mexican Laws
Even with the introduction of the GLEEEP, the compre-
hensive environmental legislation of Mexico in 1988, the
IBWC and SEDUE have managed issues concerning trans-
boundary water resources ineffectively because of a lack of en-
forcement powers and financial resources. 57 Mexico and the
United States have had great difficulty in providing adequate
facilities for the rapid population and industrial growth at the
border.25" Despite Mexico's current law, SEDUE's lack of fi-
nancial resources has obstructed major advances in the envi-
ronmental conditions of the border area.259
254. See Developments, supra note 3, at 1550-63 (discussing role of national laws
and additional need for comprehensive international liability scheme). For example,
a radical approach to improve environmental regulation in Mexico involves better
enforcement of existing national legislation and passage of legislation granting the
United States limited jurisdiction to regulate U.S. companies relocating in Mexico.
Feeley & Knier, supra note 3, at 291-92.
255. See Feeley & Knier, supra note 3, at 288-95 (discussing lack of enforcement
measures and funding in Mexico to address environmental concerns).
256. E.g., Bucholtz, supra note 15, at 316-17 (advocating implementation under
free trade agreements to allow polluting natural resources, but only at higher cost);
see generally, Gorrie, supra note 15 (discussing disappointing environmental conditions
of Great Lakes region).
257. Feeley & Knier, supra note 3, at 285-87; see supra notes 78-84 and accompa-
nying text (discussing relevant Mexican national environmental legislation).
258. See Feeley & Knier, supra note 3, at 285-87; SEDUE, Programa Nacional para
la Proteccidn del Medio Ambiente 1990-1994, 21-22 (June 5, 1989) (admitting inability of
Mexico in addressing rapid population and industrial growth at border with respect
to water quality).
259. See EMBASSY OF MEXICO, OFFICE FOR PRESS & PUBLIC AFFAIRS, MEXICO EN-
VIRONMENTAL ISSUES-FACT SHEETS 4-5 (Sept. 1992) (setting forth statistics demon-
strating lack of resources in Mexico). By 1992, Mexico increased the number of envi-
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Without proper management and treatment of surface
wastewaters and hazardous wastes, the risk of pollution of
transboundary ground waters is great.260 Over 120 volatile or-
ganic compounds, which are carcinogenic compounds linked
to industry in the maquiladoras, have been detected in the New
River, which crosses the U.S.-Mexican border.26' The raw sew-
age conditions in the Tijuana River have similarly worsened.2 62
Furthermore, of the estimated 1850 maquiladoras in Mexico at
the end of 1990, 1035 companies were labeled significant gen-
erators of waste by the Mexican governmental agency SEDUE,
but only 33.5% complied with Mexican legislation, only
nineteen percent complied with all SEDUE requirements, and
only 14.5% recycled legally or sent residues to the United
States. 63 These statistics demonstrate the inadequacy of the
IBWC's enforcement in preserving and abating pollution of
natural resources.
b. Canadian Laws
Canadian laws, both federal and provincial, have failed to
preserve and prevent pollution of the Great Lakes region.264
Since the late 1960s, all five of the Great Lakes have contained
toxic chemicals linked to human health problems, including
dangerous levels of DDT, PCBs, and other pesticides.2 65 Since
the 1980s, numerous "point" and "non-point" sources have
contributed to the pollution of the Great Lakes.2 6 6 Although
ronmental inspectors of the border region to 200, a four-fold increase since 1989.
Id. at 4. In 1991, inspectors shut down 134 maquiladora plants for non-compliance
with environmental standards. Id. In addition, Mexico and the United States have
jointly built water treatment plants and sewage facilities along the border area. Id. at
5. In 1991, the government of Mexico announced a three-year US$460 million pro-
gram to address environmental concerns at the border. Id. at 25.
260. See IEP, supra note 18, at 111-22 to 111-25 (discussing need for wastewater
treatment of Tijuana/San Diego, Mexicali/Imperial County, Nogales/Nogales, Ciu-
dad Juarez/El Paso, Nuevo Laredo/Laredo, Bajo Rio Bravo/Lower Rio Grande).
261. Castillo & Perry, supra note 180, at 3.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. See Gorrie, supra note 15, at 46-49 (discussing current pollution of Great
Lakes region); supra notes 88-107 and accompanying text (discussing Canadian laws
that address water pollution of Great Lakes region).
265. Gorrie, supra note 15, at 47.
266. Id. at 48-50. "Point" sources include pulp mills, steel factories, pe-
trochemical complexes, assembly plants, and city sewage systems that discharge
wastes directly into the lakes or tributaries leading to the lakes. Id. at 48. Less pro-
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there have been important improvements in environmental
conditions in Canada, new types of pollution of the Great
Lakes have evolved and need to be addressed.267
c. U.S. Laws
The EPA, the IBWC, and the IJC have also failed to pro-
tect U.S. environmental interests in transboundary waters ade-
quately.268 On a national level, the EPA can enforce the CWA
to maintain specified water quality standards.269 Internation-
ally, the IBWC has the authority to protect transboundary wa-
ters at the U.S.-Mexican border.270  The IJC has similar au-
thority at the U.S.-Canadian border. 27' None of the agencies
has fulfilled expectations in protecting the valuable waters
which cross these borders.2 72 Excessive irrigation and indus-
trial use of the U.S.-Mexican waters continue,273 and pollution
of the Great Lakes basin persists.274 By the time the water
reaches the borders, the IBWC and the IJC must resort to im-
plementing costly procedures to mitigate the environmental
damage.275
gress has been made in controlling "non-point" sources, including acid rain and agri-
cultural run-off into water sources. Id. at 51.
267. Gallob, supra note 15, at 119; Gorrie, supra note 15, at 49.
268. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1314 (1988) (establishing EPA authority); 1944 Treaty,
supra note 50, art. 2, 59 Stat. at 1222-25 (establishing IBWC authority); Boundary
Waters Treaty of 1909, supra note 64, art. VII, 36 Stat. at 2451 (establishing IJC
authority).
269. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1314 (1988).
270. 1944 Treaty, supra note 50, art. 2, 59 Stat. at 1222-25. Through the IBWC,
both SEDUE and the EPA exchange water pollution regulations and industrial waste-
water pretreatment regulations for their respective countries. See IEP, supra note 18,
at 111-21. Other information exchanges include categorical effluent standards, poten-
tial treatment of industrial wastes, effluent limitation guidelines for existing sources,
performance standards for new sources, and pretreatment standards for new and ex-
isting sources of water pollution. Id.
271. Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909, supra note 64, arts. II, IV, VIII, 36 Stat. at
2449, 2450, 2451-52.
272. See Feeley & Knier, supra note 3, at 288-95 (discussing handicaps for IBWC
in Mexico, specifically lack of enforcement and insufficient funding); Gallob, supra
note 15, at 113 (discussing persistent water pollution problems of Great Lakes region
and IJC authority which lacks complete control of pollution).
273. E.g., Warren, supra note 238 (discussing salinity problems of Colorado
River).
274. E.g., Gorrie, supra note 15.
275. See, e.g., Warren, supra note 238 (discussing high costs of Yuma Valley
desalination plant).
884 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 16:848
Regardless of international laws, treaties, and national
laws, environmental cooperation between the United States
and Mexico lags far behind their economic cooperation.276
Only a joint effort to decrease international pollutants can
solve the problems associated with transboundary waters. 27
This lack of cooperation manifests itself in the ineffectiveness
of section 310(a) of the CWA to control international water
pollution.278 Since its enactment in 1972, federal courts have
never been called upon to decide EPA claims under this stat-
ute.
Similarly, the rejection of a claim under the analogous sec-
tion of the CAA demonstrates the ineffectiveness of the EPA in
addressing international pollution. 279 Due to agency inaction
and judicial reluctance to compel agency action, section 115
has been consistently criticized as ineffective. 280  The IJC,
which is primarily responsible for enforcement of international
air pollution laws between Canada and the United States, has
inadequately addressed environmental issues due to judicial
deference to EPA decisions.28 t In addition, there are substan-
tial costs associated with a case-by-case analysis for an "endan-
germent finding" and a "reciprocity finding. ' 28 2  Section
310(a) of the CWA may suffer from the same handicaps.283
5. Deficiencies in NAFTA and the IEP
NAFTA lacks specific environmental obligations to fill the
void left by customary international law, treaties, and domestic
276. See Feeley & Knier, supra note 3, at 285-95 (discussing different environ-
mental standards, weak enforcement of environmental laws, and lack of funding).
277. See id.
278. 42 U.S.C. § 7415 (1988); see supra notes 113-25 and accompanying text
(discussing federal case law and lack of EPA decision-making).
279. See supra notes 113-25 and accompanying text (discussing federal case law
and lack of EPA decision-making).
280. See Gallob, supra note 15, at 115 (discussing lack of reciprocal rights and
remedies and ineffectiveness of IJC in handling disputes concerning transboundary
resources).
281. See id.
282. Id. at 130 (discussing time-consuming process of dispute resolution for
each issue that arises). Both U.S. and Canadian courts do provide access to non-
nationals in their respective courts. Id. at 142. Both nations, however, have not rec-
ognized equal rights and remedies for non-nationals. Id. at 115.
283. See 33 U.S.C. § 1320(a) (1988) (setting forth analogous international water
pollution abatement statute).
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legislation to preserve and prevent pollution of transboundary
natural resources.284 NAFTA includes environmental condi-
tions in its chapters on investment, standards, and dispute res-
olution.285 These conditions, however, are subservient to
trade issues.286 Environmental standards are addressed only if
they have a direct impact on free trade. 8 7 The agreement pro-
vides only a vague commitment to the environment. 288 The
lack of standards and enforcement mechanisms severely limits
the effectiveness of treaty provisions contributing to environ-
mental protection.28 9
Currently, the IBWC has no authority to enforce stan-
dards under Mexico's jurisdiction.2 9  NAFTA does not pro-
vide a mechanism for procedural enforcement of an environ-
mental impact statement on investments in Mexico resulting
from the agreement. 29' In addition, NAFTA excludes the
rights of private parties under the agreement.292 Therefore,
the IBWC cannot ensure that Mexico improves or complies
with its environmental standards.
The proposed NAFTA does provide an option for alter-
nate dispute resolution for commercial disputes.2 93 It provides
that a party can suspend benefits under NAFTA in response to
non-compliance.2 94 It does not, however, define the voting
procedures or what scientific or technical information is ac-
284. Feeley & Knier, supra note 3, at 261. Similarly, Canadians are disappointed
with the CFTA because it disregards environmental issues. CFTA, supra note 14, ch.
6, 27 I.L.M. at 315-16 (setting forth only provision of CFTA that affects environmen-
tal issues by setting technical standards on agricultural products); Sanford, supra note
4, at 384 (discussing disappointment of Canadians over pollution); see supra notes
173-88 and accompanying text (discussing major provisions of NAFTA that affect
environment).
285. Brilliant, supra note 2, at 49.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id. Consequently, NAFTA resembles a "cooperation agreement" that only
places environmental issues into the negotiations and increases environmental
awareness. Developments, supra note 3, at 1555.
289. See Developments, supra note 3, at 1555-56 (discussing ineffectiveness of
agreements with few concrete obligations).
290. 1944 Treaty, supra note 50, art. 2, 59 Stat. at 1222-25.
291. See supra note 131 and accompanying text (discussing NEPA and federal
environmental assessments); 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321, 4331 (1988) (setting forth proce-
dures for environmental assessment of federal actions).
292. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 2021.
293. Id. art. 2022.
294. Id. art. 2019.
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ceptable for the resolution of environmental disputes. 295 Envi-
ronmental agreements pose special difficulties because of the
uncertainty of scientific evidence and the different levels of
technical resources among nations.2 96 Furthermore, NAFTA
does not provide whether the signatories would negotiate in-
dependent issues simultaneously.297 Experience from the
CFTA and the IJC demonstrates that an inefficient or incom-
plete decision-making process can stall negotiations on ratifi-
cation of a treaty such as NAFTA. 98
In addition, the impact of the IEP is insubstantial because
it is not a component of NAFTA.299 It is merely an expression
of a commitment between the United States and Mexico.30
Consequently, it may be easier to negotiate separate agree-
ments for free trade and environmental protection. 30 ' The
IEP could be a separate environmental agreement, but it is
currently not a proposed treaty.30 2 In addition, it does not ad-
dress environmental concerns of Canada or areas outside the
U.S.-Mexican border.30 3
Furthermore, the IEP fails to satisfy one of its own objec-
tives: to set out implementation plans to mobilize the coopera-
tive efforts of governments at all levels. 3 4 The implementa-
295. Id. arts. 2005, 2007, 2015; see Developments, supra note 3, at 1527 (discussing
advantage of having specific procedures incorporated into agreement).
296. See Developments, supra note 3, at 1529-42.
297. See NAFTA, supra note 1, arts. 2005, 2007 (setting forth major dispute res-
olution provisions); Gallob, supra note 15, at 130 (discussing time-consuming process
of resolving disputes on case-by-case basis).
298. See Developments, supra note 3, at 1527.
299. Brilliant, supra note 2, at 47-48; see supra notes 189-99 (discussing IEP).
Environmentalists argued that the IEP should be contained within the four corners of
NAFTA because
(1) NAFTA would not naturally lead to sustainable development in Mexico,
(2) the disparity of standards of Mexico and the United States would lead to
increased industry in Mexico resulting in increased pollution, and
(3) NAFTA could undermine U.S. and Canadian environmental standards
in order to compete effectively with Mexico and their lower wages and envi-
ronmental costs.
Brilliant, supra note 2, at 47-48.
300. IEP, supra note 18, at 11-1.
301. E.g., Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer,
supra note 177; see Developments, supra note 3, at 1528 (discussing its success as envi-
ronmental agreement)..
302. Feeley & Knier, supra note 3, at 267.
303. IEP, supra note 18.
304. Brilliant, supra note 2, at 48.
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tion plan proposed on water quality would address water sup-
ply, municipal waste water, control of industrial wastes, and
ground water monitoring in the border area." 5 The IEP itself
states that, given its implementation plans,10 6 future cleanup
depends on collecting more data. 0 v Presently, the U.S. and
Mexican governments are exchanging information on develop-
ments concerning ground water along the border.30 8 Salinity
and sanitary data for surface waters are exchanged through the
IBWC for the Rio Bravo/Rio Grande, the Colorado River, the
New River, and the Tijuana River.3 0 9 Accordingly, the IBWC
has primary authority to regulate transboundary waters. The
IEP prospectively suggests environmental strategies to protect
and improve water quality.3 10 As a separate document from
NAFTA, however, the IEP potentially has no effect on the envi-
ronmental standards of transboundary waters.3 1
In addition, the IEP only extends from 1992 through 1994
and incorporates short-term provisions. 2 Mexico and the
United States have had discussions only on how to handle pol-
luters at the border area. Solving the problem of trans-
boundary water pollution, however, requires long-term solu-
tions and technical goals. 3 4 For example, industrial toxic was-
tewater and sewage in the New River crosses from Mexico into
the United States, but it is too expensive to treat the entire
flow in the United States. 315 Therefore, long-term cooperative
action is needed to provide for disposal of sewage and waste-
water on the Mexican side of the border.3 16 NAFTA does,
however, promise to enhance the economic and technical re-
305. Id.
306. IEP, supra note 18, at VI-1 to VI-2 (listing goals of IEP); see supra notes 189-
99 and accompanying text (discussing provisions of IEP).
307. IEP, supra note 18, at 1-6.
308. Id. at 111-21 to 111-22.
309. Id. at 111-22. The two governments also exchange information on surface
flow from streams that cross the boundary. Id.
310. Id. at VI-3 to VI-10.
311. See Feeley & Knier, supra note 3, at 263-67 (discussing that NAFTA and IEP
are separate documents and IEP does not have treaty status).
312. IEP, supra note 18, at II-2.
313. Brilliant, supra note 2, at 49.
314. Cliff Metzner, Transboundary Sewage Problems: Tiuana/San Diego-New River/
Imperial Valley, TRANSBOUNDARY RESOURCES REP., Spring 1988, at 5-6.
315. Id.
316. Id.
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sources of Mexico. 3 1 7 Consequently, NAFTA may give effect
to the 1983 Agreement by raising the potential financial and
technical resources available to Mexico.3 18
B. The Need for Implementation and Judicial Enforcement
While international adjudication may encourage the pres-
ervation of natural resources and deter pollution of trans-
boundary natural resources, nations rarely submit to such ad-
judication unless a binding treaty exists that entitles a party to
seek a remedy in an international arbitration.31 9 In addition,
only nations may appear before the International Court ofJus-
tice.32° Unless a nation has espoused a claim, this may exclude
private parties, who are the principal polluters, from adjudica-
tion. 12 ' Furthermore, the ineffectiveness of national and inter-
national organizations in addressing international pollution
mandates the need for additional measures to protect U.S. en-
vironmental standards at the border.3 2 NAFTA provides such
an exchange in which Mexico may accept environmental obli-
gations to the United States in return for increased economic
and technical resources. 23 The CFTA demonstrates that Can-
ada and the United States already share these trade inter-
317. DEPT. OF STATE DISPATCH, supra note 10, at 111. With NAFTA, Mexico
should be able to finance infrastructure improvements, technological and scientific
pollution control strategies, and efficient resource management. Feeley & Knier,
supra note 3, at 285.
318. See Feeley & Knier, supra note 3, at 285; see 1983 Agreement, supra note 61,
art. 2, 22 I.L.M. at 1026 (setting forth minimum obligation under 1983 Treaty);
DEPT. OF STATE DISPATCH, supra note 10, at Ill (predicting economic and technical
growth in Mexico to strengthen environmental protection at border).
319. Developments, supra note 3, at 1501-02. Only one international environmen-
tal treaty that addresses oil pollution encourages signatories to submit disputes to
the International Court ofJustice. Id. at 1501 n.58; see 1954 International Conven-
tion for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil, May 12, 1954, 12 U.S.T. 2989,
327 U.N.T.S. 3.
320. Statute of the International Court ofJustice, June 26, 1945, arts. 94, 95, 59
Stat. 1031, 1051 (1945); e.g., Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 253, 267-272
(Judgment of Dec. 20); (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1974 I.CJ. 457, 472-478 (Judgment of Dec. 20).
321. Id.; see supra notes 35-38 (discussing state responsibility and role of private
citizens in international law).
322. See discussion supra part III.A (discussing inadequacies of laws, treaties, in-
ternational agencies, and proposed agreements); see generally Developments, supra note
3 (discussing inadequacies of current international environmental regulation).
323. Feeley & Knier, supra note 3, at 285.
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ests. 324 The United States and Canada may also seek to rein-
force their efforts to preserve and prevent pollution of water
resources at the U.S.-Canadian border.3 5 Since NAFTA can-
not guarantee environmental protection,32 6 two safeguards
would ensure that U.S. standards concerning the quality and
quantity of transboundary waters will be maintained. First, the
IBWC and the IJC should be empowered to set and enforce
reasonable technical standards and long-term plans for trans-
boundary waters under the existing treaties.3 27 Second, there
should be judicial enforcement of section 310(a) and section
505(a) of the CWA32" based on permanent finding of reciproc-
ity of laws to encourage compliance with such standards.3 2
Effective treaty implementation normally requires stringent
monitoring and enforcement of treaty provisions.33 0
1. The Role of the IBWC and the IJC in Enforcement
of Treaties
A more effective treaty than NAFTA would include an ex-
plicit framework of procedures and duties governing its imple-
324. CFTA, supra note 14, 27 I.L.M. at 281; see supra notes 159-66 and accompa-
nying text (discussing primary role of CFTA).
325. CANADIAN REVIEW, supra note 6, at 46. Article 904 of NAFTA may allow
Canada to continue to adopt and enforce measures to protect Canada's waterways.
Id. Since most of the new NAFTA-induced economic growth in the United States
would most likely occur in the south and imports would not be expected to increase
significantly, NAFTA probably would not drastically affect the conditions of trans-
boundary resources. Id.
326. See supra notes 173-88 and accompanying text (discussing NAFTA provi-
sions that involve environment).
327. See Feeley & Knier, supra note 3, at 285-92 (advocating harmonization of
standards and better enforcement of environmental laws). With respect to additional
agreements on environmental regulation, on December 17, 1992 President Bush of
the United States, President Salinas of Mexico, and Prime Minister Mulroney of Can-
ada separately signed NAFTA. See David A. Gantz, NAFTA Update (Reid & Priest
International Business Transactions Newsletter), Feb. 1993, at 8. President Clinton
of the United States has endorsed NAFTA and promised not to renegotiate the
agreement. Id. at 9. He has instead decided to encourage the negotiations of subsid-
iary agreements, including an agreement on environmental protection. Id. NAFTA
and subsidiary agreements are likely to be submitted to the U.S. Congress by the
early summer of 1993 in order to enter into force as scheduled on January 1, 1994.
Id.
328. See 33 U.S.C §§ 1320(a), 1365(a) (1988) (setting forth international pollu-
tion abatement and private citizen suit statutes).
329. See Gallob, supra note 15, at 147-48 (advocating equal access to courts to
ensure compliance with environmental laws).
330. Developments, supra note 3, at 1551.
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mentation by an international agency."' International agen-
cies can monitor treaty compliance, lower information-gather-
ing and processing costs, and effectively enforce international
commitments." 2  They can also work with other interest
groups and place pressure on nations to comply with treaty
provisions.3 3 The efforts of international agencies are also
unlikely to raise significant state sovereignty concerns." 4 A
treaty can minimize the sovereignty ceded by affording an
agency scientific legitimacy and expertise. 3 " International
agencies can stimulate the growth of environmental science
and adequately train national officials." 6 If a nation believes
that an agency will act on objective standards, it can expect
consistent agency action and is more likely to comply with
treaty provisions.3 37
Various implementation schemes for the IBWC are possi-
ble.338 One such implementation scheme could require that
U.S. companies relocating in Mexico register with the EPA,
thereby eliminating some of the reliance on SEDUE, an ineffi-
cient government agency.3 39 In addition, an implementation
scheme could require U.S. companies in Mexico to contribute
to long-term development of the infrastructure.3 40 The U.S.
government could set a fee for all environmental services and
directly related revenues to SEDUE.3 4' Also, the U.S. govern-
ment could implement rigorous evaluations for high-risk in-
dustries.3 42 There could be a multinational tracking system to
facilitate planning and enforcement. 43 The IBWC, which has
331. See id. at 1559 (advocating specific implementation schemes and proce-
dures for effective treaties in general).
332. Id. at 1551-52.
333. Id. at 1552.
334. Id.
335. Id. at 1559-60.
336. Id. at 1552.
337. Id. at 1560.
338. Castillo & Perry, supra note 180, at 4-5.
339. Id. at 4.
340. Id.
341. Id.
342. Id.
343. Id. at 4-5. These are just some possible implementation schemes. See HEL-
SINKI RULES, supra note 141, arts. xxxi, xxxii, xxxiv. These rules recommend the
formation ofjoint agencies for the resolution of disputes. Id. art. xxxi. These agen-
cies would formulate plans in the interests of affected states. Id. If the joint agency
fails to resolve the dispute, the nations involved should seek mediation by a third
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international authority under the 1944 Treaty, 44 should de-
vise and maintain such implementation schemes.
In addition to implementation schemes, the IBWC, in co-
operation with the EPA and SEDUE, should enforce higher en-
vironmental standards in Mexico and in the United States. 345
Increased economic and technical resources can facilitate
treaty compliance. 346 In his introduction to the GLEEEP,3 47
the 1988 Mexican federal environmental law, former President
de la Madrid of Mexico recognized that improvement of envi-
ronmental standards and regulation requires economic stabil-
ity.3 48  Mexico has announced a three-year US$460 million
program for border cleanup.349 President Bush proposed a
budget for fiscal year 1993 including US$243 million to ad-
dress border environmental issues, more than double the
amount of the previous year. 50 Increased resources should
raise the level to which Mexico is bound under the 1983
Agreement to act to "the fullest extent practicable" to improve
the environment.3 5 ' Standards could improve according to a
specified timetable. With fewer economic burdens, the signa-
tory countries also would be more likely to enforce environ-
party or qualified international organization or person. Id. art. xxxii. If still unsuc-
cessful, the nations should form an ad hoc conciliation commission. Id. The final
alternative to resolve the dispute should be an ad hoc tribunal or the International
Court ofJustice. Id. art. xxxiv.
344. 1944 Treaty, supra note 50, art. 2, 59 Stat. at 1222-25.
345. Feeley & Knier, supra note 3, at 287 (advocating harmonization of environ-
mental standards of Mexico and United States).
346. Id.
347. See supra notes 78-84 and accompanying text (setting forth major aspects of
GLEEEP).
348. IEP, supra note 18, at 11-3. President de la Madrid of Mexico recognized
that "the conflict between environmental protection and economic development in
Mexico has now arrived at the point where the best environmental solution is also
often the best economic solution." Id.
349. DEPT. OF STATE DISPATCH, supra note 10, at 114.
350. Id. Funds are allocated for water supply and wastewater treatment; munici-
pal solid waste treatment; highway, bridge, and border-crossing projects; and the
provision of necessary utilities in housing areas. Id. at 114-15. The 100-year-old
IBWC is currently constructing a joint sewage treatment plant at Nuevo Laredo to
improve quality of water of the Rio Grande. Id. A major international wastewater
treatment plant at Nogales, Arizona is underway. Id. Construction ofajoint sewage
treatment project at the San Diego/ Tijuana area has begun. Id. Also, the IEP pro-
vides for improvements of the New River near Mexicali and Calexico, California. Id.
351. 1983 Agreement, supra note 61, art. 2, 22 I.L.M. at 1026; see Feeley &
Knier, supra note 3, at 285 (discussing possibility of environmental improvements in
Mexico with better economic and technical resources).
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mental laws. 352 The IBWC, a well-established international
agency, should be given greater authority to resolve disputes
and to enforce higher environmental standards.353
Similarly, Canada and the United States should expand
IJC authority under the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 to
include explicitly the regulation of transboundary water pollu-
tion. 354 Additional IJC authority can further improve those en-
vironmental conditions.355 Some treaties already place liability
on private operators.3 56 NAFTA could also include a provi-
sion for private liability to encourage compliance with environ-
mental laws. 57
2. The EPA and Law Enforcement
In addition to expanding powers of international agencies,
Canada, Mexico, and the United States should guarantee effec-
tive judicial authority to enforce environmental standards on
pollution of transboundary resources.3 58 Prior difficulties in
implementing analogous national air pollution laws suggest fu-
ture obstacles to the implementation of international pollution
abatement statutes, such as section 310(a) of the CWA.359 Pol-
lution abatement at the border requires cooperation between
the United States and Mexico. 360 A permanent "reciprocity
finding" should facilitate suits between the United States and
Mexico.36' Only court-based remedies offer routine and non-
352. See Feeley & Knier, supra note 3, at 285.
353. Id. at 288 (advocating more comprehensive and stronger enforcement au-
thority of SEDUE, EPA, and IBWC). The IBWC, however, provides the greatest op-
portunity to enforce environmental standards in Mexico because it can better protect
the sovereignty of both nations. Developments, supra note 3, at 1559-60.
354. See Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909, supra note 64, art. IV, 36 Stat. at 2450
(setting forth treaty provisions concerning pollution of transboundary water re-
sources); supra notes 66-74 and accompanying text (discussing IJC authority).
355. Wetstone & Rosencranz, supra note 69, at 133-34.
356. E.g., International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage,
1969, 9 I.L.M. 45 (1970) (establishing personal liability for injuries resulting from oil
pollution).
357. See generally JEFFREY G. MILLER, CITIZEN SUITS: PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF
FEDERAL POLLUTION CONTROL LAws 4 (1987).
358. Id.
359. See Gallob, supra note 15, at 112-19 (discussing obstacles to analogous pro-
vision of CAA).
360. See supra notes 108-25 and accompanying text (discussing CAA and CWA
and obstacles in judicial system).
361. E.g., Her Majesty the Queen ex rel Ontario v. United States Environmental
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politicized access to enforce environmental legislation. In ad-
dition, an "endangerment finding" need not be site-specific
where a nation is liable for acts within a nation that substan-
tially harm water quantity or quality in another nation. 62
Fewer legal obstacles from the EPA and U.S. courts should fa-
cilitate litigation and ensure compliance with environmental
standards.
Environmentalists are especially concerned because re-
cent court rulings have denied standing to environmental
groups and private citizens to sue to enforce both substantive
and procedural laws. 63 Private citizen suits, however, would
encourage compliance with regulations by government agen-
cies.3 64 These private citizen suits could be enforced under
section 505(a) of the CWA. 65 The EPA could also ensure
compliance with domestic U.S. environmental standards.366
Some countries, like Mexico, often fail to protect the environ-
ment because they set low environmental standards, do not al-
low private citizens to invoke these standards, or lack the
power to enforce these standards.3 67 Some commentators
urge countries with stronger environmental regulation, such as
the United States, to extend their authority to influence other
countries through extraterritorial legislation and adjudica-
tion. 68 Control of irrigation and industrial uses of rivers, typi-
cal "non-point" source pollution, is essential in eliminating the
Protection Agency, 912 F.2d 1525 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (discussing failure of EPA to
make "reciprocity finding"); see Gallob, supra note 15, at 147-48 (advocating equal
access and remedies for non-nationals in courts).
362. See Gallob, supra note 15, at 130 (discussing delays that impede "endanger-
ment finding"). Consequently, this would enhance environmental regulation of
"non-point" sources of pollution. See Kneese, supra note 229, at 3 (discussing envi-
ronmental problems at U.S.-Mexican border); Gorrie, supra note 15 (discussing envi-
ronmental problems at U.S.-Canadian border).
363. See supra notes 126-33 and accompanying text (discussing statutory and ju-
dicial obstacles to both procedural and substantive legislation).
364. See generally MILLER, supra note 357, at 4 (stressing importance of private
citizen suits to ensure compliance with water pollution legislation).
365. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1988).
366. See Developments, supra note 3, at 1609.
367. Id. at 1610 (discussing potential for extraterritorial enforcement of na-
tional laws).
368. Id. at 1610-11. An example of extraterritorial legislation is a federal statute
requiring U.S. corporations abroad to adhere to EPA standards. Id. at 1611. An
example of extraterritorial adjudication is allowing a U.S. court to hear private claims
of foreign citizens damaged by a U.S. corporation. Id.
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destruction of transboundary water resources at both the U.S.-
Mexican and U.S.-Canadian borders.3 69
CONCLUSION
National environmental laws and international agreements
have been ineffective in preserving transboundary water re-
sources and preventing their pollution. Evolving international
law, the North American Free Trade Agreement, and the Inte-
grated Environmental Plan should give effect to existing laws
and treaties through economic incentives and shared, environ-
mentally-protective technology. The history of minimal en-
forcement of environmental standards at the U.S.-Mexican
boundary, however, supports the additional need for specific
implementation regulations, IBWC enforcement authority,
and enforcement by the EPA through section 310(a) of the
CWA and private citizen suits under section 505(a) of the
CWA. The pollution of the Great Lakes, which may not be sig-
nificantly affected by NAFTA, still suggests the need for addi-
tional IJC authority and enforcement of environmental legisla-
tion through U.S. courts. NAFTA may represent a growing
commitment to the environment, which the CFTA avoided.
Where government enforcement fails to maintain environmen-
tal standards, private citizen actions are more likely to succeed.
The imminence of the passage of NAFTA, however, demands
greater international agency authority and more effective and
efficient court-based remedies to address preservation and pol-
lution abatement of transboundary waters.
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369. See Kneese, supra note 229, at 3 (discussing environmental problems at
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